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ABSTRACT
This study contsnds that prsvious investigations into 
the nature of internal labor markets have been hampered by 
their dependence on various macro-level variables (e.g., 
sectors, industries, strategies) that ignore the often wide 
variation of employment arrangements within individual 
firms. It proposes that a better understanding of the 
employment arrangements associated with individual jobs may 
be gained by not only examining a job's technological 
components, but also the relative power of a firm's various 
coalitions.
The data used in the reported study were acquired from 
the headquarters of the U.S. Bureau of Employment and 
Training's Occupational Field Analysis Centers in Raleigh, 
NC, and described 2 50 jobs in nineteen firms operating in 
six industries. They were collected between 1986 and 1990. 
Eight hypotheses were tested using hierarchical multiple 
regression.
Results indicate that employment arrangements are at 
least in part the result of bargaining (both explicit and 
implicit) over definitions of work and the relative power 
of the parties involved in such negotiations. That is, 
that the inclusion of jobs in internal labor markets is a 
function of the power employees have over the actual labor 
process (i.e., task interdependence and jobholder choice)
vii
and the power employees have to restrict available labor 
supplies in the external market (i.e., union representation 
and firm-specific skills).
viii
Chapter 1 
Introduction
The research undertaken in this dissertation 
investigates internal labor markets from a job-level 
perspective. In doing so, it departs from earlier work 
which has taken a macro-level approach to explaining this 
topic. Macro-level research, primarily based in sociology 
and economics but more recently management, has examined 
factors such as labor market dualism (Doeringer & Piore, 
1971; Edwards, 1979); the industrial sector or the 
particular industry in which a firm is located (e.g., Beck, 
Horan, & Tolbert, 1978; Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988;
Tolbert, 1982), and the type of business-level strategy a 
firm employs (e.g., Miles & Snow, 1984; Schuler & Jackson, 
1987) as means for explaining the internal labor market 
phenomenon. These approaches, however, have failed to 
recognize the dynamic and diverse nature of individual 
firms. Each has assumed homogeneity of technologies as 
well as of employment arrangements across firms, not to 
mention within departments.
In this dissertation it is argued that a more complex 
conceptualization of work settings would facilitate a 
better understanding of internal labor markets. In 
particular, it is argued that the focus of the above
1
2the exclusion of job-level factors. Firms should, in 
general, not be viewed as monolithic in their employment 
arrangements. Within a particular firm, for example, there 
are usually substantial variations in the promotion 
structures for various types of jobs and jobholders.
Whether this structure is due to technological 
requirements, control considerations, or custom, firms are 
likely to establish different promotion structures for 
different types of jobs and jobholders. For instance, for 
many jobholders, employment in large white-collar firms 
such as banks or insurance companies means job security, 
career prospects, and formal rules with respect to such 
outcomes as promotion. However, within these same firms, 
there may be a large number of clerical jobs with low pay, 
high turnover, and limited prospects for upward mobility 
{Osterman, 1982) .
Such variation in a firm's employment arrangements 
suggests the possibility that there are underlying 
differences in the characteristics of various jobs that 
make them more or less likely to be included in an internal 
labor market. Drawing on research examining the 
relationship between technology and organization structure 
{e.g., Blau & Schoenherr, 1971; Eisenhardt, 1985; Hachen,
19 88; Hickson, Pugh, & Pheysey, 19 69; Ouchi, 1979; Perrow, 
1967; Thompson, 1967), it is arguable that one way to 
examine these differences is to explore the (a)
3interdependence among jobs, and (b) amount of choice 
jobholders have in performing their work.
A second notion underlying this research is that 
employment arrangements associated with individual jobs are 
not strictly determined by a firm's objective features. 
Instead, it is argued that a job's technological components 
(e.g., task interdependence and amount of jobholder choice) 
are often manipulated as various coalitions (e.g., unions, 
professions) within a firm jockey for power (e.g., Benson, 
1977; Cyert & March, 1963; Fligstein & Fernandez, 1988; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981, 1989; Stark, 1986). Thus, 
it follows that employment arrangements are also the result 
of conflict over definitions of work and the relative power 
of the coalitions involved (Boswell, 1988; Fligstein & 
Fernandez, 1988; Scott, 1987; Stark, 1986; Strang & Baron, 
1990).
This introduction outlines the rationale for the 
dissertation, the nature of the problem it addresses, and 
introduces three key terms (i.e., internal labor markets, 
task interdependence, jobholder choice). It is organized 
into six sections: (1) definitions of key terms, (2)
statement of the focal research problem, (3) reasons for 
studying job-level characteristics and internal labor 
markets, (4) significance of the study, (5) outline of 
subsequent chapters, and (6) chapter summary.
41.1 Definitions of Kev Terms
Theoretical relationships among the dissertation's 
focal variables will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Before proceeding, however, three key 
terms will be defined: (a) internal labor markets, (b)
task interdependence, and (c) jobholder choice.
1.1.1 Internal Labor Markets
According to Dunlop (1966), the term internal labor 
market refers to "the complex of rules which determines the 
movement of workers among job classifications within 
administrative units, such as enterprises, companies, or 
hiring halls" (p. 32). Doeringer and Piore (1971) add to
this definition that entry into an internal labor market is 
firm controlled, and that jobholders are usually promoted 
from lower-level jobs to higher-level jobs by means of 
orderly "lines of progression" or job ladders. Lines of 
progression are said to exist when "work on one job 
develops the skills required for more complex tasks on the 
job above it, and those at one point in the line constitute 
a natural source of supply for the next job along the line" 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971, p. 58). In this sense, internal 
labor markets result from administrative rules and 
procedures, and can be characterized as "any cluster of 
jobs ... that have three basic structural features: (a) a
job ladder, with (b) entry only at the bottom, and (c) 
movement up this ladder, which is associated with a
5progressive development of knowledge or skill" (Althauser & 
Kalleberg, 1981, p. 130).
1.1.2 Technology
One important way in which technologies differ is in 
terms of the degree of task interdependence they create 
among jobs (Thompson, 1967). Task interdependence refers 
to the relations that exist among jobs —  the degree to 
which job performance depends on the accomplishment of 
other associated jobs. Thompson's (1967) distinction 
between long-linked, mediating, and intensive technologies 
is designed to capture such differences. Long-linked 
technologies are characterized by serial interdependence in 
which job 'C' cannot be accomplished until jobs 'A' and 'B' 
have been completed (e.g., assembly-line jobs). In 
mediating technologies there is little interdependence 
among jobs. That is, for example, job 'C' does not require 
that a previous job be completed before it can be 
accomplished. Instead, connections are among jobs and 
clients or customers rather than among jobs (e.g., sales 
clerks or telephone operators). Finally, intensive 
technologies can have both high and low degrees of 
interdependence. In these instances, all possible 
relations among jobs can exist (e.g., R&D jobs).
Another way in which technologies differ is in the 
degree to which jobholders need to make choices prior to 
and during transformation processes (Perrow, 1967). in
6this dissertation the term jobholder choice refers to the 
amount of autonomy or discretion individuals have as a 
result of the technological characteristics of their jobs. 
For Perrow, raw materials can differ in (a) the degree to 
which they are well understood, and (b) their stability or 
variability. If a material is not well understood, choices 
must be made prior to transformation. If it is well 
understood, but its properties are unstable or highly 
variable, then choices must be made throughout its 
transformation. Finally, if a material is both well 
understood and stable, then standardized procedures can be 
used to control transformation processes. Thus, because of 
the nature of the raw materials encountered, jobs should 
entail varying degrees of choice (i.e., autonomy or 
discretion). In such situations employee choice and 
management uncertainty are reciprocally related.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
The overall objective of this dissertation research 
is to explore empirically internal labor markets from a 
job-level perspective. It is the contention of this study 
that previous investigations into the nature of internal 
labor markets have been hampered by their dependence on 
various macro-level variables (e.g., sectors, industries, 
strategies) that ignore the often wide variation of 
employment arrangements within individual firms. Thus, it 
is proposed that a better understanding of the employment
arrangements associated with individual jobs may be gained 
by not only examining a job's technological components, but
also the relative power of a firm's various coalitions.
1.3 Reasons for Studying Job-level Characteristics 
The current investigation argues that previous 
research into internal labor markets (e.g., Beck, Horan, &
Tolbert, 1978; Edwards, 1979; Miles & Snow, 1984;
Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988; Tolbert, 1982) has assumed that 
both the explanatory (e.g., labor market dualism, 
industrial sectors, business-level strategies) and 
dependent variables (e.g., internal labor markets) being 
studied are homogeneous categories. Evidence suggests, 
however, that explanatory variables such as industry 
boundaries and business-level strategies only imperfectly 
capture meaningful distinctions in employment arrangements. 
For example, Baron and Bielby (1980) found that because of 
diverse technologies and administrative techniques, United 
States Employment Service analysts often could not agree 
whether certain industries even existed. Moreover, even 
when the existence of an industry has been established, 
researchers often find classifying a particular firm into a 
particular category to be problematic. That is, industries 
differ greatly in the degree to which their primary 
products are produced within an industry and the extent to 
which particular firms specialize in those products.
8Similar imperfections also create problems when 
business-level strategy is used to capture meaningful 
differences in employment arrangements. First, such 
strategies are in part a result of industry context 
(Mintzberg, 1983). Second, as Porter (1985) has noted, 
there is a distinct difference between professed and actual 
strategy. Moreover, as he and others (e.g., Miles & Snow,
1978) have repeatedly stated, many firms fail to conform to 
a single distinctive strategic pattern.
Even when these problems of aggregation can be 
overcome, an assumption of homogeneity across these 
categories (i.e.,labor markets, industrial sectors, 
business-level strategies) leads to a second assumption 
that is particularly important to the study of internal 
labor markets. Namely, that one or a few variables can 
adequately represent the operations of an entire category. 
For example, attempts by Schuler and Jackson (1987) to 
associate business-level strategies with the human resource 
practices of specific firms assume that a particular 
strategy necessarily leads to a single set of employment 
arrangements. The problem here, as with attempts to match 
industrial sectors to human resource practices (e.g., 
Bluestone, 1970; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Edwards, Reich, 4 
Gordon, 1975; Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988), is one of level 
of analysis. As macro-level analyses, these studies assume 
that the dependent variable of interest (i.e., human
9resource practices and, more specifically, internal labor 
markets) is homogeneous at the institutional or 
organizational-level. That is, many researchers have 
assumed not only that industries or strategies are 
homogeneous, but also that employment within firms is 
homogeneous as well.
Extensive research into the relationship between 
technology and organization structure (e.g., Billings, 
Klimoski, & Breaugh, 1977; Child & Mansfield, 1972;
Comstock & Scott, 1977; Grimes & Klein, 1973; Hachen, 1988) 
indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity across 
firms as well as within departments. For example, Hickson, 
Pugh, and Pheysey (1969) found that, contrary to the 
findings of previous research (e.g., Woodward, 1965), 
structure in large organizations will be relatively 
unaffected by operations technology. Recognizing internal 
labor markets as a specific example of organization 
structure, it seems reasonable to expect that there is 
usually substantial variation in promotion opportunities 
for different jobs and jobholders (Baron & Bielby, 1980; 
Baron, Davis-Blake, & Bielby, 1986; Edwards, 1979; Hachen, 
1988; Osterman, 1984). Indeed, almost all macro-level 
research into internal labor markets has ignored the 
relationship between specific jobholder tasks and positions 
on the one hand and those of supervisors, subordinates, and 
co-workers on the other. Also ignored is the fact that
10
research indicates that many if not most decisions 
regarding things such as technology and structure are 
highly political {e.g., Pfeffer, 1981, 1989).
In sum, macro-level studies have, in general, paid 
little attention to how work and jobs are actually 
organized within firms. Thus, it is proposed that a better 
understanding of the employment arrangements associated 
with jobs (i.e., internal labor markets) may be gained 
through an examination of the technological components of 
jobs, as well as the relative power of various coalitions 
to define those components. Research at this level of 
analysis might also assist in assessing the relative merits 
of the previously mentioned macro-level research. For 
example, do technical and structural arrangements within 
firms reflect differences between labor markets, industrial 
sectors, or strategies? Do the relations among jobs in 
particular labor markets, industrial sectors, or strategic 
contexts reflect more formally defined career opportunities 
than jobs in other categories? Are these jobs associated 
with indicators of participant power such as scarcity of 
skills, unions, or professional associations?
1.4 Significance of the Study
This research is aimed at advancing our understanding 
of internal labor markets. To date, the vast majority of 
internal labor market studies have examined factors such as 
labor market dualism (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Edwards,
11
1979); the industrial sector or the particular industry in 
which a firm is located (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert,
1978; Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988; Tolbert, 1982), and the 
type of business-level strategy a firm employs (e.g., Miles 
& Snow, 1984; Schuler & Jackson, 1987). A recognition of 
heterogeneity of technologies as well as employment 
arrangements across firms and departments, however, 
suggests potential benefits to be derived from a closer, 
more micro examination of internal labor market 
characteristics.
The goal of this dissertation is to offer a more in- 
depth explanation of the nature of internal labor markets. 
The intent of the macro-level approaches mentioned above is 
to overcome what is seen as an oversimplification by 
previous researchers (e.g., Becker, 1964; Hauser, 1980) of 
issues associated with individual career mobility and 
advancement. An overaggregation on the part of macro-level 
approaches, however, ignores the often substantial 
variation in employment arrangements within and between 
individual firms. More specifically, these approaches 
overlook the interactions of decisions regarding a job's 
technological components, political jockeying for power by 
various coalitions within a firm, and the consequences of 
these interactions for individual career mobility and 
advancement. It is hoped that this research will permit a 
better understanding of the way macro variables associated
12
with labor markets, industrial sectors, and business-level 
strategies together with organization structure, influence 
the micro-relations among jobholders, employers, and jobs.
In practical terms, the linking of job-level 
characteristics to organization structure should be 
significant in at least two ways. First, it is possible 
that public policy aimed at reducing such persistent 
problems as unemployment and poverty has been hampered by 
the exclusive use of remedies either too broad {e.g., 
national employment programs) or too specialized (e.g., 
individual training programs). It may be that an 
additional consideration, the relationship between job- 
level characteristics and individual career advancement, 
provides a more tangible starting place for explaining and 
correcting instability in individual employment patterns.
Second, some researchers (e.g., Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 
1988,* Tichy, Fombrun, & Devanna, 1984} contend that, to 
implement business-level strategies, it is mandatory for a 
firm to consider its human resource practices. Although 
this assessment is certainly valid, a simple matching of 
abstract human resource policies to strategic alternatives 
without recognition of the interactions of job-level 
characteristics (e.g., task interdependence, jobholder 
choice), internal labor markets, and the relative power of 
relevant coalitions may inadvertently harm strategy 
implementation and, ultimately, firm performance (Child,
13
1984). Thus, according to these researchers, managers 
should perforin a thorough examination of the technological 
components of jobs, internal labor markets, and decision­
making constraints (e.g., scarcity of skills, union 
prerogatives) a firm confronts as well as those it will 
face in the future before attempting to match human 
resource practices to strategic plans.
1.5 Outline of Subsequent Chapters
Chapter 2 reviews relevant job-level research as well 
as previous technology/structure findings. Special 
emphasis is placed on the limited amount of previous 
research on internal labor markets using a job-level 
perspective. Because this dissertation is a departure from 
extant research, prior internal labor market studies 
focusing on a more macro approach are not recounted in 
great detail. However, these studies are reviewed in 
sufficient depth to capture those aspects that are directly 
relevant to the dissertation. For interested readers, 
summaries of the macro-based internal labor market 
literature are otherwise available (e.g., Althauser, 1989; 
Baron & Bielby, 1980; Granovetter, 1986; Osterman, 1988).
Chapter 3 outlines theoretical justifications for the 
research hypotheses investigated. Research objectives and 
research questions are also stated.
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Chapter 4 outlines the research design and discusses 
the methodology used in data collection. Statistical 
analyses that were undertaken are also discussed.
Chapter 5 presents and discuss ensuing research 
results.
Chapter 6 provides conclusions that can be drawn from 
the research results and considers directions for future 
investigation. Study limitations are also acknowledged.
1.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined the rationale for this 
dissertation, the nature of the subject it addresses, and 
provided reasons for studying internal labor markets from a 
job-level perspective. Additionally, the significance of 
the study was addressed and an outline of subsequent 
chapters was presented.
Chapter 2 
Internal Labor Market Research
This chapter reviews prior internal labor market 
research with special emphasis on the role of job-level 
characteristics. Conceptual issues and problems 
characteristic of previous research are discussed. Based 
on this discussion, it is argued that examination of 
internal labor markets from a macro perspective alone is 
unlikely to provide sufficient insight into how and why 
these employment arrangements are constructed. Moreover, 
it is suggested that continued insistence on a monocular 
explanation of internal labor markets will serve only to 
hamper theoretical progress in this area and that an 
interactive approach to the relationship between variables 
at the job-level of analysis holds promise for learning 
more about the nature of internal labor markets.
Comparatively little job-level research has been 
directed at understanding how and why internal labor 
markets develop. This neglect is especially true with 
regard to interactions among job-level characteristics. 
Consequently, this dissertation is largely exploratory. 
However, many of the ideas and findings provided by 
previous internal labor market research as well as past 
studies of technology and organization structure (e.g.,
15
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Hickson, Pugh, & Pheysey, 1969) can be useful guides in the 
current examination.
This chapter is divided into two main sections: (a)
previous macro-level research into internal labor markets, 
and (b) job-level research. Previous macro-level research 
into internal labor markets is subdivided into research on 
dual labor markets, research on industrial sectors or 
particular industries, and research on business-level 
strategies. Job-level research is subdivided into previous 
internal labor market research and a discussion of the 
theoretical basis for this research. This dissertation is 
primarily directed at issues relating to the content of 
internal labor markets (e.g., a job's technological 
components) and social forces that define this content.
2.1 Macro-level Internal Labor Markets Research
Although macro-level studies of internal labor markets 
have been done at a variety of analytical levels, they 
share at least two underlying similarities. Whether 
researchers have looked to industrial sectors, labor market 
dualism, or business-level strategies as the source of 
variation in the use of internal labor markets, all make 
assumptions regarding managerial choice and homogeneity of 
employment arrangements.
Proponents of labor market dualism (e.g., Doeringer & 
Piore, 1971) assert that labor markets are subdivided into 
those characterized by the widespread use of internal labor
17
markets (i.e., primary markets) and those characterized by 
the relative absence of internal labor markets (i.e., 
secondary markets). Although researchers using this 
perspective disagree about whether or not this division is 
the result of efforts aimed at either labor control (e.g., 
Edwards, 1979) or improving operational efficiency (e.g., 
Piore, 1975), all seem to assume managerial choice in such 
matters.
Researchers who look at industrial sectors (e.g., 
Averitt, 1968; Beck, Horan, fit Tolbert, 1978) as a basis for 
understanding internal labor markets accept the dualists' 
position regarding the existence of multiple labor markets. 
However, labor market dualism is seen as only one outcome 
of the differential resources controlled by core and 
periphery firms and their resulting ability to implement 
successfully strategic plans at an industry level.
Finally, there are those researchers (e.g., Sonnenfeld 
& Peiperl, 1988) who propose that the presence of internal 
labor markets is directly related to a firm's choice of 
business-level strategy. Thus, in terms of managerial 
choice, the primary difference between these macro 
perspectives is one of level of analysis (i.e., labor 
market, industrial sector, firm) and the proposed intent 
underlying managerial choice.
A second similarity in these macro approaches to 
internal labor markets lies in their treatment of the
employment arrangements involved. Each fails to recognize 
the diversity of employment arrangements to be found in a 
single firm, to say nothing of variance across firms and 
industries. For example, those taking either a dual labor 
market or an industrial sector approach have implied that 
firms of a particular type are characterized by the use of 
internal labor markets. That is, human resource practices 
are homogeneous at the institutional or organizational- 
level. This assumption presupposes that all of the jobs 
within a firm or industry are identical and that employment 
arrangements are homogeneous as well.
2.1.1 Dual Labor Markets Theory
The basic hypothesis of the dual labor markets theory 
is that an overall labor market is subdivided into two 
distinct divisions (i.e., primary and secondary markets), 
and that each has a unique set of human resource practices 
prompting, respectively, the widespread use of internal 
labor markets as contrasted with the relative absence of 
internal labor markets. Piore (1975) states that,
the former (i.e., primary sector) offers jobs with 
relatively high wages, good working conditions, 
chances of advancement, equity and due process in the 
administration of work rules, and above all, 
employment stability. Jobs in the secondary sector, 
by contrast tend to be low-paying, with poorer working 
conditions and little chance for advancement; to have
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a highly personalized relationship between workers and 
supervisors which leaves wide latitude for favoritism 
and is conducive to harsh and capricious work 
discipline; and to be characterized by considerable 
instability in jobs and a high turnover among the 
labor force, (p. 126)
Piore (1975) adds that while jobholders in the primary 
sector thus normally have access to the benefits of 
internal labor markets, their counterparts in the secondary 
sector are typically subject to job competition in the 
external marketplace.
As noted, researchers with this perspective disagree 
as to the source of this differing access. Some economists 
(e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971) assert that internal labor 
markets develop as a result of firm-specific skills and on- 
the-job training. They argue that attempts to increase 
operational efficiency through constant adjusting of 
equipment and operating procedures results over time in a 
firm's various technologies becoming more and more 
idiosyncratic. As a consequence of this increasing 
technological idiosyncracy, skill requirements also tend to 
become more firm-specific. Accordingly, these economists 
posit that internal labor markets are used to foster 
specific skills and, through on-the-job training, to 
facilitate their enhancement.
Although other economists (e.g., Edwards, 1979) do not 
disagree with the association of firm-specific skills and 
on-the-job training with internal labor market functioning, 
they disagree about the reason for this connection. They 
(e.g., Gordon, Edwards, & Reich, 1982) see internal labor 
markets as part of a larger managerial strategy for 
controlling the supply, skill, and behavior of labor. It 
is argued that division of labor and automation are 
typically implemented in a manner that not only reduces 
costs, but also maximizes managerial control over 
production and labor.
Braverman (1974), for instance, contends that this 
"control imperative" (as opposed to a "technological 
imperative") is manifested in the deskilling or separation 
of work into two elements: conceptualization and
execution. Conceptualization includes such things as 
choice of product, rate of production, and technology and 
is placed almost exclusively in managerial hands, while the 
execution of work is assigned to labor. As a result, work 
is differentiated along lines largely unrelated to skill 
and, more insidiously (in Braverman's view), labor becomes 
homogeneous with regard to required expertise. Thus, 
again, according to Stone (1974) and others (e.g., Edwards, 
1979; Gordon, Edwards, & Reich, 1982)), it is precisely 
because of these outcomes that internal labor markets are
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implemented by management as a means to pacify and regulate 
labor (who naturally object to such deskilling).
2.1.2 Industrial Sectors
Whereas Piore (1975) and others (e.g., Bosanquet £ 
Doeringer, 1973; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Klitgaard, 1971) 
have examined segmentation in terms of labor market 
characteristics (i.e., primary versus secondary) and labor 
control, still others (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978; 
Bluestone, Murphy, & Stevenson, 1973; O'Connor, 1973; 
Tolbert, 1982) contend that the industrial sector in which 
a firm is located is a more important factor to consider. 
These latter researchers view labor market characteristics 
and labor control as merely the outcomes of an economy 
divided into core and periphery firms. Core firms are 
postulated to have greater financial and political power 
than periphery firms and thus are to some degree shielded 
from competition. This protection produces segmented 
industry structures and, hence, impacts both labor market 
characteristics and their associated employment 
arrangements (e.g., use of internal labor markets).
The emergence of industrial sectors is commonly linked 
to the development of a "core" group of oligopolistic 
corporations that grew to dominate the U.S. economy during 
the late-19th and early-20th centuries. In contrast, 
peripheral industries are characterized by much smaller 
firms operating in relatively competitive environments.
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Although much of the research done under the industrial 
sector rubric has employed various industrial 
classifications (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978), it 
should be remembered that while many core firms can be 
found in a particular set of industries, it is economic 
power and not location that establishes a firm's core 
status (Averitt, 1968). That said, Bluestone, Murphy, and 
Stevenson (197 3) summarize the defining features of these 
two sectors as follows:
The core economy includes those industries that 
comprise the muscle of American economic and political 
power.... Entrenched in durable manufacturing, the 
construction trades and to a lesser extent, the 
extraction industries, the firms in the core economy 
are noted for high productivity, high profits, 
intensive utilization of capital, high incidence of 
monopoly elements, and a high degree of 
unionization. What follows normally from such 
characteristics are high wages.... Workers who are 
able to secure employment in these industries are, in 
most cases assured of relatively high wages and better 
than average working conditions and fringe 
benefits.... Concentrated in agriculture, nondurable 
manufacturing, retail trade, and subprofessional 
services, the peripheral industries are noted for 
their small firm size, labor intensity, low profits,
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low productivity, intensive product market 
competition, lack of unionization, and low 
wages. Unlike the core..., the periphery lacks the 
assets, size, and political power to take advantage of 
economies of scale or to spend large sums on research 
and development, (pp. 28-29)
The industrial sector approach would suggest that this 
division (i.e., core versus periphery) has a significant 
impact on the type and extent of opportunities an 
individual jobholder experiences. It is posited that in 
the core sector human resource systems are characterized by 
highly differentiated tasks, wage structures, and internal 
labor markets, while in the periphery such elements are 
notably restricted or nonexistent (Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 
1978; Gordon, 1972; Spilerman, 1977; Tolbert, 1982).
2.1.3 Strategic Processes
The most recent macro approach to the study of 
internal labor markets centers on business-level 
strategies. This approach differs from the dual labor 
market and industrial sector approaches in that its origin 
is in the strategic planning literature. Moreover, 
researchers working in this area (e.g., Schuler & Jackson, 
1987, 1989) have chosen as their focus human resource
systems in general rather than internal labor markets in 
particular. Despite this focus, their discussions of human 
resource systems implicitly revolve around the presence or
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absence of internal labor markets in association with 
particular business-level strategies.
This perspective proposes that the underlying logic of 
a firm's overall business strategy makes it more or less 
compatible with particular types of human resource systems. 
To date, three research streams, grounded in two different 
strategy typologies, are predominant. First, Miles and 
Snow (1978) suggest that for a firm's strategy to be 
effective requires that its management address three 
problems: (a) the entrepreneurial problem or definition
and selection of a product market, (b) the engineering 
problem or selection of an appropriate technology to serve 
a chosen domain or market niche, and (c) the administrative 
problem or selection of control systems for reducing 
operational uncertainty within a firm. It is their 
contention that a management's response to these problems 
should specify the relations among a firm's overall 
strategy, technology, and structure such that it can be 
viewed as an integrated whole.
In terms of human resource practices. Miles and Snow 
(1984) suggest that a firm's dependence on internal labor 
markets will vary depending on its choice of product market 
(i.e., the entrepreneurial problem) and associated 
technology (i.e., the engineering problem). At one 
extreme, those firms whose success comes primarily from 
efficiently serving a narrow, stable domain (i.e., a
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defender strategy) are likely to promote the development of 
ever more idiosyncratic technologies (cf. Doeringer &
Piore, 1971) and, thus, are also likely to employ highly 
developed internal labor markets as a means to reduce 
operational uncertainty control {i.e., the administrative 
problem). In contrast, those firms whose success is based 
on a continuing search for new product and market 
opportunities (i.e., a prospector strategy) are likely to 
shun the development of stable, firm-specific technologies 
and skills in favor of a more flexible approach (i.e., 
these firms should have few if any internal labor markets). 
Degrees of dependence on internal labor markets will vary 
as a firm's responses to its entrepreneurial and 
engineering problems vary between these two extremes.
Another group of researchers (e.g., Sonnenfeld & 
Peiperl, 1988) also base their studies on the Miles and 
Snow (1978, 1984) typology (i.e., defenders, prospectors,
analyzers). In this case, however, a firm's choice of 
business-level strategy and subsequent technical and human 
resource decisions are more intimately tied to the nature 
of its industry. While Miles and Snow (1978) only briefly 
examine the influence of environment on managerial choice, 
this more recent formulation focuses almost exclusively on 
industry effects. That is, Sonnenfeld and Peiperl (1988) 
tend to equate particular types of industries with 
particular strategic responses. Thus, in their recognition
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of the homogeneity-producing impact of industries, 
Sonnenfeld and Peiperl (1988) move toward a multi-level 
analysis of factors influencing internal labor market use.
Finally, some researchers (e.g., Schuler & Jackson, 
1987, 1989) have somewhat unsuccessfully attempted to link
human resource practices and generic business strategies 
(i.e., focus, differentiation, cost leadership; Porter, 
1985). In contrast to what Miles and Snow (1984) have 
suggested, these researchers posit that firms using a 
differentiation strategy to establish the perceived 
uniqueness of their goods/services should use varied 
employment arrangements (i.e., broad career paths) to 
reinforce the development of a range of general job skills. 
For firms that use a quality enhancement or focus strategy
to concentrate their attention on a specific domain or
market niche, these researchers likewise posit that the 
employment issue that is most crucial is extensive and 
continuous training to ensure predictable employee 
behavior. And, in firms that pursue a cost leadership 
strategy to aggressively pursue operating efficiencies, 
these researchers expect to find narrowly defined 
employment arrangements that encourage specialization, 
expertise, and efficiency.
2.2 Job-level Research
As has been noted, one of the most pervasive problems 
with most macro-level internal labor market research is its
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assumption of homogeneity across firms and within 
departments. For this reason many researchers (e.g.,
Baron, Davis-Blake, & Bielby, 1986; Osterman, 1982) argue 
for the superiority of a job-level approach to the analysis 
of internal labor markets. For example, Baron and Bielby 
(1980) contend that because employment arrangements within 
firms are the focus of most macro-level internal labor 
market research, it makes little sense to examine extra- 
organizational variables (e.g., industrial sectors) to the 
exclusion of more directly related variables at the 
organization and job-levels (e.g., task complexity, skill 
levels).
As also previously noted, the assumption of 
homogeneity seems to stem, in part, from a lack of 
attention to organization theory research dealing with such 
areas as technology and competing coalitions (Baron & 
Bielby, 1980). Inclusion of relevant research in these 
areas as an additional basis for studying internal labor 
markets arguably offers promise for sensitizing researchers 
to the unreasonableness of viewing firms as monolithic in 
their employment arrangements. Continuing debates in 
organization theory over concepts and measures of both 
technology and power (e.g., Benson, 1977; Form, Kaufman, 
Parcel, & Wallace, 1988; Hickson, Pugh, & Pheysey, 1969; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Piore & Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1987), not to 
mention organization structure (e.g., Aldrich, 1972; Drazin
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& Van de Ven, 1985; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988; Van de Ven & 
Delbecq, 1974), and organizational decision making (e.g., 
Child, 1972; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; March & Simon, 
1958; Williamson & Ouchi, 1981) are clear indications of 
the variability to be found within organizations. Close 
examination will also show that much of the job-level 
research to be discussed in this section recognizes this 
variability but fails to consider possible interactions 
among such variables.
2.2.1 Previous Job-level Research
Job- and organization-level explanations for the 
existence of internal labor markets appear to fall into one 
of three categories: (a) management/labor conflicts; (b)
firm-specific skills and on-the-job training; and (c) 
scarcity of labor. Some historical accounts of internal 
labor markets attribute their existence to conflicts among 
production workers, union or professional workers, and 
their employers (e.g., Bills, 1987; Cole, 1979; Elbaum, 
1984; Finlay, 1983; Schroeder & Finlay, 1986), That is, 
internal labor markets are seen by some as part of a 
control strategy that emerges from management's attempt to 
"turn the tide of conflict on the shop and office floor 
decisively in its favor" (Edwards, 1979, p. 180).
In an analysis of the historical development of 
internal labor markets in U.S. manufacturing, for example, 
Jacoby (1984) found that the primary impetus for internal
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labor markets was management's concern over growing shop 
floor conflict and the fear that such conflict would 
ultimately result in unionization. Similarly, Schroeder 
and Finlay's (1986) study of hospital and chemical 
technicians suggests that differences in the two groups' 
access to internal labor markets are also the result of 
conflict. In this case, chemical technicians' jobs were 
included in internal labor markets because of their power 
in relation to management. On the other hand, hospital 
technicians were denied these benefits, in part, because of 
the presence of a more powerful professional group (i.e., 
physicians). Finally, Elbaum (1984) found that skilled 
non-union workers in the steel industry gained power 
because they posed a threat to both the steel workers' 
union and management. That is, these workers had 
"strategic responsibility for operations, equipment, and 
materials at bottlenecks" in the production process as well 
as the skills necessary to act as strikebreakers (p. 99).
The concepts of firm-specific skills and on-the-job 
training as constituent factors in the development of 
internal labor markets can be found in studies focusing on 
a variety of explanatory forces (e.g., labor control, 
operational efficiency, human capital). In terms of 
particular jobs or occupations, several studies support 
this linkage. Kanter's (1984) study of the careers of 
managers in high tech firms is especially supportive of
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Williamson and Ouchi's (1981) markets and hierarchies 
approach (cf. Diprete, 1987). She argues, for example, 
that internal labor markets are likely to be more elaborate 
where tasks require firm-specific skills, and where tasks 
are high in uncertainty and, thus, difficult to monitor. 
Wholey (1985) found similar results in his study of 
internal labor markets in large law firms. Like Kanter 
(1984), he found that firm-specific skills were a 
determining factor in the development of internal labor 
markets for attorneys. However, he also found that the 
power to bring in new clients (or take them away) was also 
important.
Although these studies support the use of firm- 
specific skills and on-the-job training as factors 
associated with internal labor markets, others (e.g.,
Baron, Davis-Blake, & Bielby, 1986) provide both mixed and 
contradictory support. For example, the Schroeder and 
Finlay (1986) study previously mentioned'supports the firm- 
specific skill theory only with respect to chemical 
technicians. This finding held true even though both 
groups of workers (i.e., hospital and chemical technicians) 
had comparable mixes of firm-specific and general skills.
In direct contradiction to the firm-specific skill/on-the- 
job training thesis, Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby (1986) 
found that specific skills were only related to jobs above
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entry-level and that these jobs could also be entered from 
outside a firm.
Schroeder and Finlay also found only indirect support 
for on-the-job training in that "jobs directly associated 
with process technology [where theoretically there is a 
premium on the transmission of skills across workers] 
tended to be in longer, relatively structured ladders...." 
(p. 261). Pfeffer and Cohen (1984), too, offer only mixed 
confirmation. They used two measures of firm-specific 
skills (i.e., vestibule training and on-the-job training), 
neither of which is consistently associated with internal 
labor markets. The only significant relationship to be 
found was between on-the-job training and status as a non­
manufacturing firm. Such reports that manufacturing jobs 
and entry-level jobs are unrelated to internal labor 
markets are obviously in contradiction to previous 
statements (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Williamson,
1981) regarding the likely development of such employment 
arrangements (Althauser, 1989).
Finally, Althauser (1989) proposes that the unifying 
element in explanations of internal labor markets within 
firms as well as occupational labor markets across firms is 
scarcity of skills. He argues that, "by definition, firm- 
specific [and occupation- specific skills] are not 
available from the external market" (p. 156). In support 
of this idea, Osterman (1987) reports that when the supply
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of secretaries was tight, the firms he studied chose to 
create internal labor markets. Bills' (1987) in-depth case 
study of three different firms (i.e., manufacturing, 
hospital, consulting) also supports Althauser's (1989) view 
in at least two cases. Both Northside Manufacturing and 
Exurb Consulting purposely developed internal labor markets 
in an attempt to secure a stable, long-term workforce under 
conditions of scarcity. The third internal labor market 
that Bills (1987) studied (i.e., City Hospital) faced no 
such scarcity, but instituted an incernal labor market as a 
way to mitigate turnover problems. Lastly, Pfeffer and 
Cohen (1984) found no connection between scarcity of skills 
and internal labor markets. However, as Althauser (1989) 
states, their use of an organization-level measure of 
scarcity is an insufficient test of the thesis that 
scarcity of skills causes firms to develop internal labor 
markets.
2.2.2 Theoretical Basis for the Present Study
Like the macro-level research into internal labor 
markets, much of the extant micro-level research also tends 
to assume that managers' choices, whatever they may be 
(e.g., operational efficiency versus labor control), are 
unconstrained. A corollary to this assumption is that 
either technology (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971; 
Williamson, 1981) or control (e.g., Edwards, 1979; Stone, 
1974) has causal priority in achieving operational goals.
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In this section I will discuss each of these assumptions 
and show how considering both may provide new insight into 
the reasons and ways internal labor markets develop.
Working from cyert and March's (1963) coalitional 
approach to organizational decision-making,one can view few 
firms as unified actors. Rather, virtually all firms can 
be alternatively viewed as shifting combinations of 
interest groups (i.e., competing coalitions) moving up and 
down in power. When a particular group has a monopoly over 
some valued resource, such as legal or scientific 
expertise, it is also likely to have power within its 
organization (e.g., Hickson et al., 1971; Hinings et al., 
1974). One of the ends to which this power is often put is 
the shaping of a firm's structure. As part of this 
structuring, more powerful groups will typically try to 
increase the amount of discretion in their own jobs while 
maintaining or reducing the level of discretion in other 
jobs (Scott, 1987). Such claims for increased job 
discretion or autonomy are often justified by "proofs" of 
the comparative complexity or value of the jobs in question 
(e.g., Dornbusch & Scott, 1975; Friedson, 1970).
Task descriptions then cannot be seen as wholly 
objective statements of work demands since they are based 
on subjective perceptions of the complexity or value of 
individual jobs. Thus, if we view firms as always being 
composed of competing coalitions (i.e., labor and
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management), it is reasonable to conclude that the 
definition of such internal labor market factors as firm- 
specific skills, operational efficiency, and so on are at 
least partially perceptual. Moreover, as perceptions, they 
are also subject to some degree of control by the currently 
dominant coalition (i.e., the group with the most power; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981, 1989; Stark, 1986). For 
example, if labor desires more autonomy it is likely to 
emphasize the complex and uncertain nature of its tasks.
In contrast, managers who wish to retain control are likely 
to define labor's tasks as simple and routine. Which 
concept of reality prevails is in part based on power 
(Benson, 1977). Scott (1987) argues that this is 
particularly true in firms with a large number of 
professionals. It would also seem reasonable to expect 
that this would be true for firms with a strong union 
(especially when new technologies are introduced), as well 
as under conditions of labor scarcity.
In a recent reconstruction of Williamson's (1981) 
transaction cost approach to work relations, Boswell (1988) 
and others (e.g., Fligstein & Fernandez, 1988) come to 
similar conclusions with regard to organizational power.
In general, Williamson (1981) and others (e.g., Wachter & 
Wright, 1990) assert that firms will choose hierarchical 
arrangements (e.g., internal labor markets) over 
competitive market processes when the transaction costs of
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doing business in a market exceed those that would be 
incurred by internalizing these transactions. Transaction 
costs are the "exact costs of negotiating and writing, as 
well as the ex post costs of executing, policing, and when 
disputes arise, remedying the contract" (Williamson, 1981, 
p. 154 5). The "contract" in this case being an employment 
contract.
For Williamson, transaction costs are a function of 
two factors —  asset specificity {e.g., firm-specific 
skills) and the degree of difficulty encountered in 
monitoring individual productivity. Asset specificity 
occurs when workers have firm-specific skills or other 
firm-specific assets such as in-depth knowledge of work 
procedures. The result of this asset specificity is labor 
scarcity or what Williamson (1975) calls a "small numbers 
game." Difficulties in monitoring individual productivity 
are the result of an imbalance in information (i.e., 
bounded rationality). Monitoring becomes difficult when 
workers have a high degree of choice or discretion in how 
work is done (what Williamson terms "information 
impactedness"), and when it is impossible to determine 
individual team members' contributions (what Williamson 
terms "interdependence").
Boswell (1988) contends that labor/management conflict 
is the primary determinant of transaction costs. 
Williamson's (1981) information impactedness/
interdependence concepts and asset specificity are 
reinterpreted as "worker control" over the labor process 
and "worker power" in the external labor market, 
respectively. Control over the labor process, which is 
associated with monitoring difficulties, is due to workers' 
ability to engage in collective restriction of output 
(i.e., interdependence) and the necessity for creative 
decision making inherent in some tasks (i.e., information 
impactedness). Power in the labor market, which is 
associated with asset specificity, is manifested when 
individuals with firm-specific skills can safely threaten 
to quit and when groups like unions or professions can 
restrict hiring and firing. Thus, internal labor markets 
are likely to exist where labor has power to raise 
transaction costs such that "management cannot afford to do 
without them" (Boswell, 1988, p. 142).
Once the possibilities of conflict and discretion have 
been introduced, recourse to a monocular" explanation of 
internal labor markets such as operational efficiency or 
labor control becomes untenable. That is, organizational 
participants can no longer be seen as passive entities 
forever compelled to reflect the inevitable logic of a 
single causal mechanism. As Child (1972) and others (e.g., 
Georgiou, 1973; Zey-Ferrell 4 Aiken, 1981) have asserted, 
there is almost invariably an opportunity for choice in a 
firm's overall technology and organization structure. For
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example, Gerwin (1979) gives two examples in which research 
purporting to support the determining value of technology 
can also be interpreted as support for a 11 structural 
imperative." First, Blau and Schoenherr (1971) concluded 
that decentralization in employment security agencies was 
the result of automation which was thought to provide an 
impersonal means of labor control. However, Gerwin (1979) 
argues that an initial choice of decentralization could 
have been followed by a model of technical support based on 
multiple computer facilities. A second example is Perrow's 
(1967) contention that nonroutine technologies produce low 
formalization and low centralization. Alternatively, he 
has since suggested that a decision not to organize things 
that could be organized might in turn produce 
nonroutineness. Similarly, if as has been suggested, 
concepts of tasks are in part perceptually determined, then 
the structural framework in which work is performed is 
likely to be an important factor. That is, tasks can be 
divided and simplified through differentiation, while 
professionalization can increase task complexity and 
discretion (Scott, 1987). Such was the case in Glisson's 
(1978) study of human service organizations. He found that 
differentiation and procedural specifications determine the 
degree of routinization.
Based on this discussion of competing coalitions and 
the nature of the technology/control relationship in
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organizations, it is proposed that internal labor markets 
are the result of multiple factors. in particular, it will 
be argued that decisions informed by efficiency and labor 
control considerations are constrained by within- 
organization power differentials. It will likewise be 
argued that coalitions (whether labor or management) are 
limited by considerations of operational efficiency and 
labor control in the extent to which their choices can be 
fully recognized. Thus, internal labor markets are posited 
to be the result of interactions among multiple factors.
2.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed previous macro- and micro-level 
internal labor market research and presented the 
theoretical argument underlying this dissertation.
Previous macro-level internal labor market research has 
assumed both an excessive degree of homogeneity across 
firms and within departments, as well as unconstrained 
managerial choice. Micro-level research, while recognizing 
diversity within firms, has largely accepted the dominance 
of managerial choice and single-variable explanations.
It was proposed that a better understanding of 
internal labor markets can be gained from a recognition of 
limits to efficiency and labor control considerations, as 
well as to the power of competing coalitions. It was also 
proposed that internal labor markets are the result of 
interactions among multiple - factors.
The following chapter outlines the theoretical 
justification for selected research hypotheses. Research 
objectives, research questions, and hypotheses are also 
stated.
Chapter 3
Research Objectives, Questions, and Hypotheses
This chapter outlines and discusses the research 
objectives, and questions used to study and test the 
following stated hypotheses. Accordingly, it is arranged 
into three major sections: (1) research objectives, (2)
research questions, and (3) hypotheses.
1^1 Research Objectives
The principle objective of the reported research was 
to explore empirically internal labor markets from a job- 
level perspective. To understand internal labor markets, 
it seems necessary (as argued) to go beyond previous macro­
level explanations (i.e., dual labor markets, industrial 
sectors, business-level strategies) to a consideration of 
micro-level phenomena. A fuller appreciation arguably 
requires that we examine the interactions of other factors 
that have not traditionally been the focus of previous 
internal labor market studies. At a minimum, such an 
examination must recognize the variability in employment 
arrangements within departments and across firms, as well 
as investigate the factors (e.g., competing coalitions) 
that influence this variability. Most micro-level research 
into internal labor markets has examined these individual 
factors as monocular explanations.
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The second research objective is to compare and 
contrast the influence of power variables (e.g., union jobs 
versus non-union jobs) and job-level technology variables 
(e.g., task interdependence) on a job's inclusion in an 
internal labor market. As noted in the preceding chapter, 
the majority of micro-level studies have examined internal 
labor markets from one of three approaches (i.e., 
operational efficiency, labor control, labor/management 
conflict). Each of these approaches entails both implicit 
and explicit assumptions regarding the causal priority of 
one variable over all others. Some researchers (e.g., 
Edwards, 1979; Gordon, Edwards, & Reich, 1982) contend that 
internal labor markets are only part of a larger managerial 
strategy for controlling the supply, skills, and behavior 
of labor. in contrast, Williamson (1975) and others (e.g., 
Doeringer and Piore, 1971) argue for the primacy of a 
technological imperative. Still others (e.g., Elbaum,
1984; Jacoby, 1984) have suggested that~internal labor 
markets are a function of conflicts between management and 
labor. Support for each of these approaches is significant 
enough to warrant a comparison as well as an examination of 
the combined effects these variables have on internal labor 
markets.
The third objective of the reported research is to 
develop a better understanding of internal labor markets by 
considering the degree to which job-level technology and
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power variables combine to determine the existence of 
internal labor markets. Working from a transaction cost 
perspective, Boswell (1988) has argued that technology 
creates situations in which one group (e.g., labor) may 
gain power over the activities of another group (e.g., 
management). This argument is consistent with the case of 
skilled non-union workers in Elbaum's (1984) study who 
gained some measure of power over both union and management 
as a result of their critical workflow positioning. Benson 
(1977) and others (e.g., Mintzberg, 1983; Scott, 1987), 
however, have suggested that power provides groups with an 
opportunity to define job-level technologies in such a 
manner as to serve and protect the status quo. Schroeder 
and Finlay's (1986) study of equally skilled chemical and 
hospital technicians illustrates the validity of this 
position. Obviously, these viewpoints (i.e., that 
technology creates power versus power influencing 
technology) are not mutually exclusive. ' Thus, it would 
seem that the debate should not revolve around the causal 
ordering of technology and power, but rather around their 
potential interaction on the formation of internal labor 
markets.
3.2 Research Questions
Four central questions were investigated in this 
dissertation. These questions stem from the three research 
objectives discussed in the previous section and pertain to
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the relationship between technical and power variables in 
internal labor markets, the relationship of these variables 
to one another, and their combined on the development of 
internal labor markets. Each of the research questions is 
outlined below.
Research Question #1: What is the relationship of
job-level technology variables (i.e., task interdependence, 
jobholder choice) to internal labor markets? More 
specifically, what features differentiate jobs that are and 
are not included in internal labor markets? Do these 
features covary or are they independent? If they covary, 
is the relationship similar across internal labor markets?
Research Question #2: What is the relationship of
power variables (e.g., unionization) to internal labor 
markets? Again, what features differentiate jobs that are 
and are not included in internal labor markets? Do power 
variables related to formal associations (i.e., unions, 
professions) covary with a more general"indicator of labor 
power (i.e., labor market scarcity)?
Research Question #3: What is the relationship
between the job-level technology variables addressed in 
Research Question #1 and the power variables in Research 
Question #2? Do technology variables covary with power 
variables? How can the differences among these variables 
be explained?
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Research Question #4: How does the combined influence 
of technology and power relate to the presence of internal 
labor markets? What combination of variables 
differentiates jobs that are and are not included in 
internal labor markets? Are different combinations of 
variables associated with different internal labor markets?
3.3 Hypotheses
Eight hypotheses were developed in three areas to 
address the aforestated research objectives and questions. 
The hypotheses cover the relationship of: (1) job-level
technology variables to internal labor markets, (2) power 
variables to internal labor markets, and (3) technology and 
power variables to one another as well as their combined 
impact on internal labor markets.
3.3.1 Technology
The relationship between technology and organization 
structure has long been a topic of inquiry. Early 
comparative investigations of this relation {e.g., Hickson, 
Pugh, St Pheysey, 1969; Woodward, 1965) proposed that a 
firm's technology was the dominant factor affecting its 
structure. For example, Woodward (1965) found that 
successful firms were often characterized by a match 
between the type of industrial technology being used (i.e., 
unit/small batch, mass production, continuous process) and 
structural variables such as specialization and 
decentralization. The Aston Group (e.g., Hickson, Pugh, &
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Pheysey, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969) later 
suggested that as organizations increase in size and become 
more differentiated the relationship found by Woodward 
(1965) does not hold. Instead, they argued that a direct 
connection between technology and structure is only valid 
in small organizations where structural responses to size 
have not begun to show. These analyses (i.e., Hickson, 
Pugh, & Pheysey, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969; 
woodward, 1965,), as well as others (e.g., Blau & 
Schoenherr, 1971; Hage & Aiken, 1967), have typically 
treated organizations as single units of analysis. Like 
the macro-level studies of internal labor markets discussed 
in Chapter 2, few of these studies considered within firm 
technological and structural diversity.
The systems-oriented perspective of researchers such 
as Thompson (1967) and Perrow (1967) have yielded a 
conceptually richer approach to the study of technology. 
This perspective recognizes, first, that several different 
technologies are typically necessary for accomplishing an 
organization's tasks. As Gervin (1982) has noted, 
organizations require not only production technologies, but 
resource acquisition, distribution, and maintenance 
technologies as well. Thus, it is likely that different 
divisions, departments, and work groups within an 
organization will employ various technologies. Second, 
since this systems view equates technology with a method of
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task accomplishment rather than with a task itself, it also 
recognizes that technology cannot be equated entirely with 
machinery. That is, technology can be machines as well as 
programs and procedures.
Task interdependence is the basis for categorization 
in Thompson's (1967) view of technology. Interdependence, 
as noted earlier, refers to the relations that exist among 
jobs —  the degree to which job performance depends on the 
accomplishment of other associated jobs. Research by 
Williamson (1975) and others (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz,
1972; Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979; Wachter & Wright,
1990) indicates that interdependence creates difficulties 
in monitoring individual productivity. Higher levels of 
interdependence create what Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have 
referred to as "nonseparabilities'* in which it becomes 
difficult for management to ascertain what portion of a 
team's productivity should be credited to individual team 
members. This situation, like that of employee discretion, 
is the result of bounded rationality or an imbalance of 
information (Williamson, 1981). In the case of discretion, 
uncertainty arises because an organization cannot be 
assured that employee decisions will always be in its best 
interest. Since discretion precludes the setting of rules 
and procedures that would allow an organization to bypass 
employee motives not consonant with its own, it may be 
necessary for an organization to bind its interests with
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those of its employees. Often, this is done through 
establishing promotion structures and long-term benefits 
programs (i.e., internal labor markets).
In the second instance, when individual productivity 
cannot be determined on an immediate basis because of 
limited information, it becomes necessary to observe 
marginal productivity over time. That is, information 
relating to individual performance must be gathered piece­
meal with a final decision as to acceptability of 
performance made at some point in the future. Thus, merit 
as a basis of reward gives way to seniority and experience 
and, again, it becomes necessary to bind individual and 
firm interests to insure against "opportunistic employees" 
(Williamson, 1981).
From a bottom-up perspective (i.e., that of employees) 
interdependence creates an opportunity for control over the 
labor process through collective action. For example, the 
productivity of piece-rate workers can be severely hampered 
by materials, suppliers, and dysfunctional peer pressure 
(Burawoy, 1979; Roy, 1958) Edwards (1979) has also 
suggested that high levels of interdependence allow worker 
control through the creation of production bottlenecks 
(see, also, Elbaum, 1984).
Although Thompson (1967) associated discretion with 
interdependence, Boswell (1988) and others (e.g., Edwards, 
1979; Gerwin, 1982; Williamson, 1975) consider discretion
to be a conceptually distinct aspect of the employment 
relationship. That is, these researchers argue that higher 
levels of task interdependence do not necessarily yield 
lower discretion or vice versa. For example, medical 
emergency teams are highly interdependent but, because of 
the variable nature of the raw materials involved (e.g., 
people, drugs), it is also necessary for team members to 
have high levels of discretion as well. In contrast, 
although industrial assembly lines are also high in 
interdependence, the raw materials utilized are generally 
well understood and stable. As a result assembly-1ine jobs 
typically have relatively low discretion. This same 
inconsistency also applies to jobs that are usually low in 
interdependence. For example, although the positions of 
bank teller and bank president both have fairly low 
interdependence with other jobs, the raw materials 
encountered in both positions require vastly different 
levels of discretion. Moreover, due to the characteristics 
of some raw materials, even using different technologies to 
perform the same task does not substantially lower 
discretion. An example of this situation is that of 
cataract surgery in the U.S. versus the former U.S.S.R. 
Although cataract surgery is organized as an intensive 
technology in the U.S., it was performed in assembly-line 
fashion in the U.S.S.R. The use of long-linked technology 
for this operation should reduce discretion to some small
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degree. However, discretion cannot be reduced 
substantially simply because the human body is much too 
variable in its responses. Thus, jobholder choice or 
discretion is often related to interdependence, but it 
should be seen as a conceptually distinct aspect of 
technology.
Again, the problem for management is one of bounded 
rationality (Williamson, 1981) in which an organization 
loses some of its ability to predict behavior and thereby 
outcomes. Thompson (1967) has said that discretion 
increases uncertainty and, to the extent that an 
organization is dependent on jobholders with discretion, 
jobholder power is also increased. Jobholder choice also 
entails increases in administrative costs. Higher levels 
of choice mean that direct supervision becomes more and 
more difficult since a single supervisor can only monitor 
so much activity. Added supervisors mean larger payrolls 
as well as costly duplications of effort and knowledge. At 
the same time, other types of information systems can be 
prohibitively expensive (Eisenhardt, 1985). As noted in 
the preceding discussion of task interdependence, 
standardization of processes and outputs also becomes more 
difficult as jobholder discretion increases. At this 
point, when any kind of measure is costly, it has been 
argued (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975; Mintzberg,
1983) that organizations have two options in reducing the
expense of uncertainty. First, organizations can hire 
those whose outside training assures ability as well as 
acceptable professional standards. Or, second, training 
and normative indoctrination can be undertaken internally. 
[It will later be shown that generally neither of these 
options reduces the potential for worker power. Each 
merely externalizes the source of power by tying a firm to 
powerful professional associations and by limiting a firm's 
pool of replacement labor.] The latter of these options 
requires a large investment of time and money that an 
organization would logically be unwilling to forfeit 
without later payoff. Such payoff would only occur if 
these employees, trained and indoctrinated, remain over an 
acceptable payback period. Desired tenure can be secured 
through the use of incentives such as promotion 
opportunities, job security, long-term benefits, and so on.
3.3.2 Power
While the job-level technology variables discussed in 
the previous section represent monitoring difficulties 
(Williamson, 1981) and thus are sources of "worker control" 
over a labor process (Boswell, 1988), the variables to be 
presented in this section involve labor scarcity and are 
thereby sources of "worker power" in a labor market. 
Williamson (1975; Ouchi & Williamson, 1981) and many others 
(e.g., Diprete, 1987; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Kanter,
1984) with an interest in understanding employment
relations attribute this worker power to the existence of 
asset specificity (explained below). However, as Althauser 
(1989) has proposed, the common element in these 
explanations of internal labor markets is not specificity 
of assets or skills per se, but the end product of any 
factor that restricts an organization's search and 
selection process in the labor market —  i.e., labor 
scarcity (also see, Fligstein & Fernandez, 1988). Scarcity 
can be an outcome of union and professional association as 
well as of asset specificity. Each of these factors, their 
impact on labor scarcity, and their relationship to 
internal labor markets will be discussed below.
Asset specificity occurs when jobholders have firm- 
specific skills or other firm-specific assets such as 
knowledge of unique company procedures or policies. As 
with monitoring difficulties, the problem in this situation 
is also caused by "opportunistic behavior" (Williamson, 
1975; also see, Matthews, 1986 who emphasizes the purely 
cognitive costs of organizing and monitoring transactions). 
The circumstance under which opportunism manifests itself, 
however, is one of "small numbers" (Williamson, 1975) 
rather than interdependence or choice. In the beginning of 
an employee-employer relation, before a jobholder's 
experience becomes firm-specific, bidding for jobs is open 
and freely competitive. However, Williamson, Wachter, and 
Harris, (1975) state that, over time
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the idiosyncratic nature of... [employee] experience 
effectively destroys parity at the contract renewal 
interval. Incumbents who enjoy nontrivial advantages 
over similarly qualified but inexperienced bidders are 
well situated to demand some fraction of the cost 
savings which their idiosyncratic experience has 
generated, (p. 265)
Thus, through the development of firm-specific skills 
and assets, what began as competitive bargaining for jobs 
becomes a restricted labor supply situation in which 
opportunistic behavior can flourish. Williamson, Wachter, 
and Harris (1975) suggest that the most efficient (i.e., 
lowest transaction cost) way of handling such 
idiosyncracies is through the development of internal labor 
markets where: (a) wages are attached to jobs rather than
individuals, (b) job promotion is from within, and (c) 
ports of entry are at lower hierarchical levels.
Attaching wages to jobs effectively negates the 
transaction costs associated with individual wage 
bargaining, yet it also increases the possibility of paying 
for productivity that never materializes. Internal 
promotion arrangements, where access to higher levels is 
restricted to internal appointments, tie the interests of 
workers to their employing firms. This, combined with 
lower-level ports of entry, allows a firm to protect itself 
against unacceptable productivity. Employees are brought
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in at lower hierarchical levels and promoted as experience 
warrants with the assumption that any mismatch between 
wages and marginal productivity at ports of entry will be 
corrected over time. "Furthermore, employees who may have 
been incorrectly upgraded but later have been 'found out,' 
and hence barred from additional internal promotions, are 
unable to move to a new organization without penalty" 
(Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, 1975, p. 274). This use of 
internal labor markets therefore addresses the problem of 
scarcity by creating a ready supply of labor within a firm.
While asset specificity (e.g., firm-specific skills) 
acts as a source of employee power in the market place, 
collective restrictions such as unions and professional 
associations also constitute sources of jobholder power in 
the external market. Boswell (1988) has argued that one 
purpose of credentialling is to restrict labor supply or 
rather to create "small numbers" bargaining (see also 
Mintzberg, 1983). With regard to unions, many researchers 
(e.g., Elbaum, 1984; Kahn, 1976) have associated their 
presence with the development of internal labor markets, 
contending that unions support internal promotion systems, 
on-the-job training programs, and seniority rights. Upon 
finding a negative relationship between the presence of 
unions and internal labor markets, Pfeffer and Cohen (1984) 
proposed that the contradictory findings were perhaps due 
to union support of such things as seniority rights on the
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one hand and their opposition to features that restrict 
labor mobility (i.e., those that tie employees to a firm) 
on the other. Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby (1986), 
however, argue that union favor depends on whether its 
members have general skills thereby making mobility and 
control over conditions of work crucial issues; or firm- 
specific skills, in which case mobility is already 
restricted and advancement opportunities within a firm take 
precedence.
Professional associations, in contrast, have 
consistently been linked to an absence of internal labor 
markets. From a transaction cost perspective, although 
professionals such as physicians, lawyers and engineers 
have valuable skills, "unless these skills are deepened and 
specialized to a particular employer, neither employee nor 
employer has a special interest in maintaining a continuing 
employment relation" (Williamson, 1981). Indeed, 
researchers (e.g., Hall, 1987; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 
1981; Scott, 1987) have argued that in addition to 
protection of skills, the primary purpose of professional 
associations is to protect member autonomy and mobility.
Based on the preceding arguments, it would seem that 
Althauser's (1989) contention that labor scarcity in 
general is more important than asset specificity alone is 
invalid. However, Boswell (1988) contends that the 
variables promoting different forms of organization are
55
numerous and that the absence of firm-specific skills does 
not always attenuate the possibility of internal labor 
markets (also see, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Finlay, 1983). 
This is especially the case "where market restrictions are 
codified through union contracts or state certification,
... [and] market restrictions can become reified and 
continue to exist even where deskilling has occurred" 
(Boswell, 1988, p. 144; also see, Strang & Baron, 1990).
One example is what Mintzberg (1983) has referred to as a 
"pseudoprofessionalism," whereby employees with general 
skills form occupational associations in an effort to 
protect their jobs and extend their autonomy. Although 
Williamson (1981) equates asset specificity and internal 
labor markets with efficiency rather than market power, he 
does however recognize that "where human asset specificity 
is slight .... the presumption is that these outcomes 
[internal labor markets] are driven more by power than by 
efficiency considerations" (p. 567). Thus, it is quite
possible that even when firm-specific skills do not exist, 
internal labor markets will. That, through the market 
power afforded by established union contracts and 
professional credentials, employees can redefine their jobs 
(Benson, 1977; Scott, 1987; Strang & Baron, 1990) and 
develop some degree of control over the labor process.
Based on these arguments the following alternative 
hypotheses were developed:
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HI.la Professional jobs with firm-specific skills are 
more likely to be located in internal labor markets 
than professional jobs with general skills.
HI.lb Professional jobs, regardless of skill type, 
are more likely to be located in internal labor 
markets than non-professional jobs.
3.3.3 Technology and Power
In this section it is proposed that the greatest 
possibility of internal labor market development arises 
where some combination of monitoring difficulties and small 
numbers exist. That is, internal labor markets should be 
most likely where workers have control over a labor process 
and the power to reinforce their control through 
restriction of supply. Each of these elements (i.e., 
process control, market power) alone provide some 
protection against market competition and create a greater 
possibility of internal promotion. However, control over 
the labor process and labor market power are to some extent 
interdependent in that the existence of one establishes 
conditions for developing the other. As has been noted, 
where competing coalitions exist (in this case management 
and labor), the efforts of each will be geared toward 
securing and increasing their own power, usually at the 
expense of opposing coalitions (Benson, 1977; Mintzberg, 
1983; Pfeffer, 1981, 1989; Scott, 1987).
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In the case of workers with control over labor 
processes, the presence of higher levels of interdependence 
or choice promotes the development of a market mechanism to 
protect that control. In contrast, the existence of power 
in the external market provides opportunities for the 
elaboration of labor process control through such things as 
increased autonomy and seniority rights. Possible 
interactions between sources of labor process control and 
market power will be discussed next. This section draws 
extensively on the works of Althauser and Kalleberg (1981), 
Boswell (1988), Edwards (1979), and Williamson (1981).
While interdependence alone has the potential for 
increasing transaction costs to a point where individual 
and small group negotiations are necessary, without the 
ability to restrict supply, leverage is greatly reduced.
The presence of unions or professional associations 
introduces this leverage and simultaneously raises 
negotiations to the firm- or industry-level. Boswell 
(1988) and Edwards (1979) contend that bargaining at this 
level increases the stability of worker associations and 
allows them to establish seniority rights within an 
industry. Where asset specificity is the source of market 
power, results should be the same as with worker 
collectives except that the turnover costs should be 
higher.
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High levels of jobholder choice also have the 
potential for raising transaction costs and this generally 
results in the labor process being primarily worker 
controlled. Again, the presence of unions or professional 
associations serves to restrict labor supply and raise the 
level of labor negotiations. The primary difference 
between this situation and that engendered by 
interdependence is that the focus of negotiations should be 
on preservation of skills and choice or discretion rather 
than wages and seniority (Althauser & Kalleberg, 1981; 
Edwards, 1979). Asset specificity once more raises 
turnover costs for both parties and as a result may 
introduce seniority rights as an additional point of 
negotiation (Boswell, 1988).
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses:
H2.la Jobs with high levels of task interdependence 
and union representation are more likely to be located 
in internal labor markets than jobs characterized by 
only high levels of task interdependence or union 
representation.
H2.lb Jobs with high levels of task interdependence 
and professional representation are more likely to be 
located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of task 
interdependence or professional representation.
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H2.lc Jobs with high levels of task interdependence 
and firm-specific skills are more likely to be located 
in internal labor markets than jobs characterized by 
only high levels of task interdependence or firm- 
specific skills.
H2.2a Jobs with high levels of jobholder choice and 
union representation are more likely to be located in 
internal labor markets than jobs characterized by only 
high levels of jobholder choice or union 
representation.
H2.2b Jobs with high levels of jobholder choice and 
professional representation are more likely to be 
located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of jobholder choice 
or professional representation.
H2.2c Jobs with high levels of jobholder choice and 
firm-specific skills are more likely to be located in 
internal labor markets than jobs characterized by only 
high levels of jobholder choice or firm-specific 
skills.
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has outlined and discussed the research 
objectives, research questions, and specific hypotheses 
addressed in this study.
Chapter 4 
Research Methodology
This chapter outlines the research methodology used in 
testing the aforestated hypotheses, as well as describes 
the focal subject sample, data collection and measures, and 
data analyses methods employed.
 5 amble
The data used in this study were acquired from the 
headquarters of the U.S. Bureau of Employment and 
Training's Occupational Field Analysis Centers (OFACs) in 
Raleigh, NC. To produce and periodically update The 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT; U.S. Dept, of 
Labor, 1977), OFACs analyze jobs in all U.S. industries 
that have been assigned an SIC code. Because these job 
analyses contain specific information about job 
characteristics, including job technologies, training, 
skills, and promotion hierarchies they are well suited for 
testing the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. Moreover, 
OFACs also gather information regarding the structure, 
overall technology, unionization, and environmental 
competitiveness of the organizations in which jobs selected 
for analysis are located, thus making examination of more 
macro issues (e.g., worker power, industry effects) 
possible as well.
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Using all available OFAC data, the hypotheses stated 
in Chapter 3 were tested for jobs in nineteen firms 
operating in six industries (i.e., medical services, 
printing/publishing, electrical equipment, electronic 
components, radio/ television broadcasting, and aircraft 
manufacturing). The job analyses which underlie the data 
to be examined were conducted between 1986 and 1990. 
Appendix A contains a list of all 250 jobs, as well as 
their DOT codes and occupational classification. With 
respect to the latter, 95 jobs were DOT classified as 
professional and kindred, 33 as clerical/sales, 4 as 
service work, 12 as process work, 45 as machine work, 21 as 
benchwork, 22 as stuctural work, and 18 as miscellaneous 
work. This sample size is sufficient to detect a minimum 
correlation between a predictor and criterion of .18 with a 
power value of .80 (according to tables provided by Cohen, 
1977) .
4.2 Data Collection and Measures
4.2.1 Data Collection
The primary method of OFAC data collection is 
observation-interview, with supporting data coming from job 
descriptions, interviews with administrators, and so on in 
target organizations. Job analysts are trained in data 
collection at OFACs by senior analysts and receive 
refresher courses every few years. The information 
gathered from observations and interviews is recorded on
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Job Analysis Schedules (JAS), while information on 
organization structure and the like is recorded in a 
Narrative Report (NR). Appendix B is an example of a 
completed JAS, and Appendix C a completed NR.
4.2.2 Dependent Variable
Internal labor market standing was based on four 
binary variables created for each of the 250 jobs examined. 
This information was taken from the JAS associated with
each job. The first variable was coded "l" if a job was in
a promotion ladder and *'0" if it was not. For jobs in 
promotion ladders, the second variable was coded "1" if it 
was at the bottom of the ladder and ”0" if it was not. For
these same jobs, the third variable was coded "1" if it
could not be entered from outside an organization and "0" 
if it could. Finally, jobs in a promotion ladder were 
coded "l" if additional promotions were available higher up 
the ladder and "0" if additional promotions were 
unavailable. For jobs that were not in a promotion ladder, 
the remaining three variables were coded as missing.
As noted in Chapter 1, Althauser and Kalleberg (1981) 
define internal labor markets as "any cluster of jobs . . . 
that have three basic structural features: (a) a job
ladder, with (b) entry only at the bottom, and (c) movement 
up this ladder, which is associated with a progressive 
development of knowledge or skill" (p. 130). In their 
study of internal labor markets Baron, Davis-Blake, and
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Bielby (1986) examine each component of this definition 
separately. However, because Althauser and Kalleberg's 
(1981) definition suggests that these elements operate in 
concert, the four binary variables were summed to create a 
single internal labor market measure, thereby allowing a 
more complete examination of the focal phenomena.
4.2.3 Independent Variables
Task interdependence was measured using DOT scores 
taken from the JAS for each job. Task interdependence 
scores represent the highest degree of interpersonal 
interaction required by a job, with each higher-level form 
of interdependence incorporating all lower forms. DOT 
measures were reverse scored to range from 1 (lowest task 
interdependence) to 9 fhicrhest task interdependence).
These scores range from intensive reciprocal 
interactions such as mentoring (i.e., "Dealing with 
individuals in terms of their total personality in order to 
advise, counsel, and/or guide them with regard to problems 
that may be resolved by legal, scientific, clinical, 
spiritual and/or other professional principles.") to simple 
mediating interactions such as diverting. Jobs classified 
as mentoring scored a 9, and include tasks such as 
"counseling clients in legal matters," and 
"advising/assisting individuals in the solution of their 
socio-economic problems." Tasks of this nature require 
constant and complex reciprocal interaction with clients
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and peers. An example of a job with a score of 9 on task 
interdependence is a speech pathologist (DOT Code 076.107- 
oio, Appendix A).
The next most complex level of interpersonal 
interaction is negotiating {i.e., "Exchanging ideas, 
information, and opinions with others to formulate policies 
and programs and/or arrive jointly at decisions, 
conclusions, or solutions.") which scores an 8 on task 
interdependence. Tasks such as "contracting with farmers 
to raise or purchase fruit and vegetable crops" also 
require a jobholder to engage in complex interactions with 
others. However, the basis of these encounters is usually 
not as constant and are more routine than those found under 
mentoring. An example of a job with a score of 8 on task 
interdependence is a director of nursing service (DOT Code 
075.117-022, Appendix A).
As noted above, decreasing complexity of interpersonal 
interaction is associated with progressively lower task 
interdependence scores. A job that scores 7 on this scale 
is an exercise physiologists (DOT Code 076.121-014,
Appendix A). Jobs that score 6 and 5 on task 
interdependence are a dispersion shift supervisor (DOT Code 
559.132, Appendix A) and an automated autoclave operator 
(DOT Code 590.362, Appendix A), respectively.
The least complex levels of task interdependence are 
represented by simple mediating interactions such as
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helping and serving (i.e., "Attending to the needs or 
requests of people or the expressed or implicit wishes of 
people."), and persuading and diverting {i.e., "Influencing 
others in favor of a product, service, or point of view."). 
Helping is scored a 4 and serving is scored a 3, while 
persuading is scored a 2 and diverting is scored a 1. For 
example, "mixes and serves alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
drinks to patrons of a bar," describes a task classified as 
serving, and "writes scripts for radio and television 
advertising," describes a task classified as persuading. 
Interdependence in these jobs is between a jobholder and 
clients or machines rather than between jobs. In Appendix 
A, jobs that score 3 and 4 on task interdependence are a 
general duty nurse (DOT Code 075.374-010) and an 
electronics mechanic (DOT Code 828.281-010), respectively. 
Examples of jobs that score 1 and 2 are disk jockey (DOT 
Code 159.147-014, Appendix A) and a sales representative 
(DOT Code 259.357-018, Appendix A), respectively.
The degree of jobholder choice or discretion a job 
allows was measured using DOT scores (taken from each job's 
JAS) that rate a job in terms of required interaction with 
data. DOT measures were reverse scored to range from 1 
(lowest discretion) to 7 (highest discretion^. "Data" are 
described by DOT as, "information, knowledge, and 
conceptions related to data, people, or things resulting 
from observation, investigation, interpretation,
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visualization, and mental creation- Data are intangible 
and include numbers, words, symbols, ideas, concepts, and 
oral verbalization." At one extreme are complex 
independent actions such as synthesizing (i.e.,
"Integrating analyses of data to discover facts and/or 
develop knowledge concepts or interpretations."). Jobs 
classified as synthesizing are scored 7 and include tasks 
such as "conceiving and developing ideas for application of 
mathematics to the fields of science and engineering", and 
"formulating editorial policies of a newspaper and 
originating plans for special features or projects." Such 
tasks require a jobholder to make independent decisions in 
what are very often unstructured and variable situations. 
The data involved are generally of an abstract nature 
(e.g., mathematical concepts, philosophical/ethical ideas). 
An example of a job that scores 7 on jobholder choice is an 
aeronautical research engineer (DOT Code 002.061-026, 
Appendix A).
The next most complex level of data interaction is 
coordinating (i.e., "Determining time, place, and sequence 
of operations or action to be taken on the basis of 
analysis of data; executing determinations and/or reporting 
on events."). The tasks involved in these types of jobs 
also require independent decision-making, and score a 6 on 
jobholder choice.. However, the nature of the data 
involved is of a more concrete variety. Tasks such as
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"authorizing, regulating, and controlling commercial 
airline flights, according to Government and company 
regulations" are included. In these instances the nature 
of raw materials (e.g., aerodynamics, flight plans) may be 
well understood and, thus, guidelines for decision making 
can be established ahead of time. However, raw materials 
also have a large degree of variability (e.g., pilot error, 
quickly changing weather conditions, mechanical failure) 
and, thus, jobs still require a great deal of independent 
decision making on the part of jobholders. An example of a 
job that scores 6 on jobholder choice is an electronics 
supervisor (DOT Code 726.130-010, Appendix A).
As noted above, decreasing interaction with data is 
associated with progressively lower jobholder choice 
scores. A job that scores 5 on this scale is a laboratory 
tester (DOT Code 029.261-010, Appendix A). Jobs that score 
4 and 3 on jobholder choice are a sheet metal numerical 
control operator (DOT Code 609.380, Appendix A) and an 
accounts-payable clerk (DOT Code 216.482-010, Appendix A), 
respectively.
As data interaction complexity decreases each 
classification reflects a more prescribed structure, 
greater situational stability and, so, allows for lesser 
amounts of jobholder choice or discretion. At the lowest 
level of the data interaction are simple prescribed actions 
like copying (i.e., "Transcribing, entering, or posting
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data.") and comparing (i.e., "Judging the readily 
observable functional, structural, or compositional 
characteristics of data, people, or things."). Copying is 
scored a 2 and comparing is scored a 1. An example of a 
task classified as copying is "transcribing addresses from 
a mailing list to envelopes, cards, advertising literature, 
packages and similar items," while "grades dressed poultry 
according to size and quality" describes a comparing task. 
Information encountered in these tasks is stable and allows 
for extensive structuring of jobs (e.g., "If X then do Y, 
else do Z."). In these cases employee jobholder choice is 
minimized. In Appendix A, jobs that score 1 and 2 on 
jobholder choice are a telephone operator (DOT Code 
235.662-022) and a mail clerk (DOT Code 209.587-026).
It has been argued (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; 
Williamson, 1975) that internal labor markets develop as a 
direct result of firms' attempts to recoup training costs 
and reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior on the part 
of workers with firm-specific skills. Conversely, 
provision of training (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Williamson, 
1975) and on-the-job experience (Williamson, Wachter, & 
Harris, 1975; Wood, 1987) are said to assist in creating 
such skills. Firm-specific skills were, following Baron, 
Davis-Blake, and Bielby (1986), measured as the sum of 
training and experience time (in months) required for entry 
into a job. Specifically, firm-specific skills were
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determined by adding orientation time, on-the-job training 
time, and time required in other positions in a firm for 
each job. These data were taken from the JAS associated 
with each job.
Information about which jobs were unionized was 
gathered from DOT NRs, A binary variable was created with 
"1" representing unionized jobs and "0" representing non- 
unionized jobs. These jobs were 28% of those sampled (n = 
70) .
DOT job codes were used to determine each job's 
professional representation. Jobs professionally 
represented were coded "1" and all other jobs were coded 
"0." These jobs were 38.4% of those sampled (n = 95).
4.3 Multicollinearitv
Because all hypotheses were tested using hierarchical 
multiple regression, the variables interdependence, job­
holder choice, and firm-specific skills were standardized 
prior to data manipulation. This transformation was done 
to minimize multicollinearity between first-order 
independent variables and their cross-products (Aiken & 
West, 1991; Cronbach, 1987).
4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined the research methodology 
employed in the dissertation research including subject 
sample, data collection and measures, and data analysis 
methods.
Chapter 5 
Data Analysis and Results
This chapter presents the results of the multiple 
regression analyses discussed in Chapter 4. It is 
organized into three sections: (1) analysis and results of
the relationship among job technology variables (i.e., 
jobholder choice and task interdependence), power 
variables, and their interactions; (2) analysis and results 
of the relationship between power variables {i.e., firm- 
specific skills, union representation, and professional 
credentials) and internal labor markets; and (3) 
supplemental analysis and results of job technology 
variables, power variables, and their interactions.
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlation 
coefficients for all study variables are presented in Table 
l. All coefficients > ± .10 are significant at p < .05. 
Internal labor market standing is significantly and 
positively related to union representation (jr *= .31) and 
firm- specific skills (p = .26), but essentially unrelated 
(£ = .02) to professional credentials. Although task 
interdependence is not significantly related to internal 
labor market standing (p = .07) or to firm-specific skills 
(p = .07), it is significantly and negatively related to 
union representation (p * -.12). Jobholder choice is 
significantly and negatively related to union
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Table 1
Correlation Matrix for all Study Variables
1 2 3
£
4 5 6
1. Internal labor
market
standing — .26 . 07 -. 12 .31 . 02
2. Firm-specific — . 07 . 14 . 15 . 05
skills
3. Task
interdependence — .31 -.12 .26
4. Jobholder
choice — -.37 . 57
5. Union
representation — -.47
6. Professional
representation —
M .92 5.71 6 . 1 0 2 .98 .26 .41
SD 1.26 17 . 56 1.98 1. 84 .44 . 49
Range 0-4 0-240 1-9 1-7 0-1 0-1
Note. d = 250. All correlations > ± .10 are significant 
at p < .05, two-tailed test.
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representation (£ = -.37), and positively associated with 
professional credentials (e = .57), and firm-specific 
skills (r - .14). Finally, jobholder choice is also 
positively related to task interdependence {£ = .31).
Thus, contrary to what Thompson's (1967) discussion of 
these concepts suggests, discretion and interdependence are 
not always negatively related. That is, an increase in 
task interdependence does not necessarily mean a 
simultaneous decrease in jobholder choice. This finding 
supports Williamson's (1981), Gerwin's (1982), and 
Boswell's (1988) contention (Section 3.3.1) that 
instability in the relationship between technological 
(e.g., task interdependence) and structural (e.gjobholder 
choice) variables requires that they be treated as 
conceptually distinct.
5.1 Market Power
Competing hypotheses HI.la and HI.lb relate to the 
relationship between professional jobs, firm-specific 
skills, and internal labor markets. HI.la states that 
professional jobs with firm-specific skills are more likely 
to be located in internal labor markets than professional 
jobs with general skills, while HI.lb states that 
professional jobs, regardless of skill type, are more 
likely to be located in internal labor markets than non­
professional jobs. Durbin-Watson statistics and variance 
inflation factors indicated multicollinearity between
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first-order variables and their cross-product interaction 
terms. To avoid multicollinearity between these 
interaction terms and their constituent variables, all 
continuous independent variables were standardized prior to 
analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Cronbach, 1987).
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to test these two 
hypotheses.
5.1.1 Test of Hypotheses HI.la and Hi.lb
To test these two hypotheses, internal labor market 
standing was regressed on professional credentials (0 = 
nonprofessional job, 1 = professional job), firm-specific 
skills, and their interaction. Table 2 presents the 
results of the multiple regression, including regression 
coefficients and AR2 for each step.
Professional credentials was entered into the 
regression equation in Step l. This initial variable was 
not significant (R2 = .000, df = 1/248, p < .72),
indicating the absence of a relationship between general 
skills and internal labor market standing. In Step 2, 
firm-specific skills was entered into the equation. This 
variable was significant (AR2 = .066, sif. = 2/247 , p <
.001), indicating a main effect. In Step 3, the resulting 
interaction term was entered. The interaction term was 
also significant (AR2 = .016, d£ = 3/246, p < .05).
Overall, the full equation explains 8.2% of the variance in 
internal labor markets and supports the contention (HI.la)
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Table 2
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal 
Labor Market Standing on Professional Credentials and 
Firm-specific Skills (HI.la and HI.lb)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
02
Main effects
Professional credentials . 059 . 027 . 025
Firm-specific skills . 332+ . 57 5+
Interaction term
Professional credentials x
firm-specific skills -.354*
. 000 . 066 . 082
. 000 . 066 .016
dl 1, 248 2,247 3,246
Note. d = 250; *p < .05; +p < .001.
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that when professional jobs have firm-specific skills 
(rather than general skills, HI.lb) they are more likely to 
be found in internal labor markets.
5.2 Technology/Power Interactions
Hypotheses H2.1 and H2.2 address possible interactions 
between job technology (i.e., task interdependence and 
jobholder choice) and power (i.e., union representation, 
professional credentials, and firm-specific skills) 
variables, and their impact on internal labor markets. As 
noted, to avoid multicollinearity between interaction terms 
and their constituent variables, all continuous variables 
were standardized prior to analysis. After examining the 
plotted residuals for the task interdependence variable it 
was determined that a reciprocal root transformation was 
appropriate to correct for skewness in this variable 
(Berenson, Levine, & Goldstein, 1983; Neter, Wasserman, & 
Kutner, 1985). Hierarchical multiple regression was used 
to test all of the eight hypotheses presented in this 
section.
5.2.1 Test of Hypothesis H2.la
H2.1a, postulating that jobs with high levels of task 
interdependence and union representation are more likely to 
be located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of task interdependence 
or union representation, was not supported. Table 3 
presents the results of the multiple regression for this
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Table 3
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Task Interdependence and
Union Representation (H2.la)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
0, 03
Main effects
Task interdependence . 095 . 148* . 146
Union representation . 9 4 6f . 949f
Interaction term
Task interdependence x
union representation .018
R; . 005 .112 . 112
LE2 . 005 . 107 . 000
df 1, 248 2,247 3 , 246
Note. n = 2 50; *p < .05; tE < *001.
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hypothesis along with regression coefficients and 
AE2 for each step. In Step 1, task interdependence was 
entered into the regression equation. This initial 
variable was not significant (£2 = .005, df = 1/248, p < 
.24), indicating no main effect. In Step 2, union 
representation was entered into the regression equation. 
This variable was significant (AE2 = .107, df = 2/247, p < 
.001), indicating a main effect of union representation on 
internal labor market standing. In Step 3, the resulting 
interaction term was entered. The interaction term was not 
significant (AE1 = .000, df = 3/246, p < .95). Overall,
the full equation explained 11.2% of the variance in
internal labor market standing.
5.2.2 Test of Hypothesis H2.lb
H2.1b, postulating that jobs with high levels of task 
interdependence and professional representation are more 
likely to be located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of task interdependence 
or professional credentials, was not supported. Table 4 
presents the results of the multiple regression along with
regression coefficients and AR2 for each step. In Step 1,
task interdependence was entered into the degression 
equation. As in the above analysis, this initial variable 
was not significant (£2 = . 005, <i£ *= 1/248, p < .24). In
Step 2, professional credentials was entered into the 
equation. Neither was this variable significant (ARJ =
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Table 4
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Task Interdependence and
Professional Credentials (H2.1b)
Independent variables Step l Step 2 Step 3
Main effects
Task interdependence .095 . 094 . 125
Professional credentials . 009 . 007
Interaction term
Task interdependence x
professional credentials - . 044
E2 .005 . 005 . 005
ARj .005 . 000 . 000
df 1,248 2 ,247 3,246
Note. n = 250.
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.000, = 2/247, p < .96). In Step 3, the resulting
interaction term was entered. The interaction term was 
likewise not significant (AE2 = .000, = 3/246, p < .82).
Overall, the full equation explained less than one percent 
of the variance in internal labor market standing.
5.2.3 Test of Hypothesis H2.lc
H2.1c, postulating that jobs with high levels of task 
interdependence and firm-specific skills are more likely to 
be located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of task interdependence 
or firm- specific skills, was supported. Table 5 presents 
the results of the multiple regression along with 
regression coefficients and AR2 for each step. In Step 1, 
task interdependence was entered into the regression 
equation. Again, this initial variable was not significant 
(R1 = .005, df = 1/248, p < .24). In Step 2, firm-specific 
skills was entered into the equation. This variable was 
significant (AR2 = .064, d£ = 2/247, p < .001), indicating 
a main effect of firm-specific skills on internal labor 
market standing. In Step 3, the resulting interaction term 
was entered. The interaction term was also significant 
(AE2 = .013, df = 3/246, p < .05). Overall, the full 
equation explained 8.3% of the variance in internal labor 
market standing.
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Table 5
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Task Interdependence and
Firm-specific Skills (H2.1c)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
0; 03
Main effects
Task interdependence . 095 . 070 . 064
Firm-specific skills . 328+ . 416f
Interaction term
Task interdependence x
firm-specific skills . 133*
R1 . 005 . 069 . 083
AR2 . 005 . 064 . 013
df 1,248 2 ,247 3,246
Note. £ = 2 50? < .05; tE < .001.
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5.2.4 Test of Hypothesis H2.2a
H2.2a, postulating that jobs with high levels of 
jobholder choice and union representation are more likely 
to be located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of jobholder choice or 
union representation, was supported. Table 6 presents the 
results of the multiple regression along with regression 
coefficients and AR1 for each step. In Step 1, jobholder 
choice was entered into the regression equation. This 
initial variable was significant (R2 = .014, df = 1/248, p 
< .05), indicating a main effect. In Step 2, union 
representation was entered into the equation. This 
variable was also significant fAR2 = .085, df = 2/247, p < 
.001). In Step 3, the resulting interaction term was 
entered. The interaction term was likewise significant 
(AR2 = .Oil, df = 3/246, p < .05). Overall, the full 
equation explained a significant 11% of the variance in 
internal labor market standing.
5.2.5 Test of Hypothesis H2.2b
H2.2b, postulating that jobs with high levels of 
jobholder choice and professional representation are more 
likely to be located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of jobholder choice or 
professional representation, was not supported. Table 7 
presents the results of the multiple regression along with 
regression coefficients and AR2 for each step. In Step 1,
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Table 6
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Jobholder Choice and
Union Representation (H2.2a)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
0^ 02 01
Main effects
Jobholder choice 155* -.006 . 082
Union representation . 9 00f .796+
Interaction term
Jobholder choice x
union representation - . 298*
E1 . 014 . 099 .110
AR- .014 . 085 .011
df 1,248 2 ,247 3 , 246
Note. n = 250; < -05; +p < .001.
84
Table 7
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Jobholder Choice and
Professional Credentials (H2.2b)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
*1 02 03
Main effects
Jobholder choice -.155* - . 255f 183
Professional credentials .362 . 600f
Interaction term
Jobholder choice x
professional credentials — .442
. 014 . 026 . 038
LE2 . 014 . 012 . 012
df 1, 248 2,247 3, 246
Note. q = 2 50; *E < .05; tE < .01.
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jobholder choice was entered into the regression equation. 
As in the above analysis, this initial variable was 
significant (E2 = .014, = 1/248, e < .05). In Step 2,
professional credentials was entered into the equation.
This variable was not significant (AE2 = .012, d£ = 2/247,
E < .07). In Step 3, the resulting interaction term was 
entered. The interaction term was not significant (AE2 = 
.011, df = 3/246, e < .10). Overall, the full equation 
explained 3.8% of the variance in internal labor market 
standing.
5.2.6 Test of Hypothesis 2.2c
H2.2c, postulating that jobs with high levels of 
jobholder choice and firm-specific skills are more likely 
to be located in internal labor markets than jobs 
characterized by only high levels of jobholder choice or 
firm-specific skills, was supported. Table 8 presents the 
results of the multiple regression along with regression 
coefficients and AE2 for each step. In Step 1, jobholder 
choice was entered into the equation. Again, this initial 
variable was significant (R1 = .014, = 1/248, p < .05).
In Step 2, firm-specific skills was entered into the 
equation. This variable was likewise significant (AE2 - 
.076, df = 2/247, e < .001), indicating a main effect. In 
Step 3, the resulting interaction term was entered. The 
interaction term was significant (A£2 = . 034, sif. = 3/246, p
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Table 8
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Jobholder Choice and
Firm-specific Skills (H2.2c)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
0, 03
Main effects
Jobholder choice -.155* 205+ -.320*
Firm-specific skills .361* .829*
Interaction term
Jobholder choice x
firm-specific skills .539*
E2 . 014 . 090 . 124
A£; .014 . 076 . 034
df 1,248 2 ,247 3,246
Note. n *= 2 50; *p < .05; +p < .01; *p < .001.
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< .01). Overall, the full equation explained a significant 
12.4% of the variance in internal labor market standing.
5.3 Post Hoc Analyses
The results of H2.la testing for an interaction effect 
between task interdependence and union representation at 
first seem to contradict the literature regarding unions 
and internal labor markets. This contradiction is 
reinforced by the significant negative correlation between 
these variables (r = -.12; Table 1). One possible, but yet 
untested, explanation for this seeming anomaly is suggested 
by Baron, Davis-Blake, and Bielby (1986), as well as 
Edwards (1979). They note that the type of interdependence 
most often associated with the presence of unions and 
internal labor markets is serial interdependence. Of the 
250 jobs examined in this study, 103 were characterized by 
the DOT as requiring serial exchanges from one worker to 
another. Believing that a more detailed examination of the 
hypothesized relationship between task interdependence and 
union representation might yield different results, a post 
hoc analysis paralleling that reported in Table 3 was 
performed using only the 103 jobs mentioned above.
However, as shown in Table 9, this was not the case as the 
interaction term was not significant (p < .79).
However, in the initial analysis of H2.la reported in 
Table 3, the significance of the task interdependence beta 
weight increased from £ = .095 (p < .24) to £ = .148 (p <
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Table 9
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal
Labor Market Standing on Serial Task Interdependence and
Union Representation (H2.1a, post hoc)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Main effects
Serial task
interdependence . 123 . 194* . 185*
Union representation 1.14 5+ 1.152f
Interaction term
Serial task interdependence X
union representation . 040
E : . 010 . 164 . 164
. 010 . 154 . 000
d£ 1, 101 2 , 100 3 , 99
Note. n = 103; *p < .01; tp < .001.
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.05) when the union representation variable was entered at 
Step 2. This increase to significance and the results of 
the above post hoc analysis suggest the possible presence 
of a "suppression effect" (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). To wit, 
union representation may be acting to suppress the 
relationship between task interdependence and internal 
labor market standing. That is, task interdependence may 
be related to internal labor markets only when the job in 
question is unionized. To test for this possibility, a 
partial correlation analysis was conducted. Union 
representation was partialled from the relationship between 
all types of task interdependence and internal labor market 
standing. As a result, the correlation between task 
interdependence and internal labor market standing 
increased from A = .07 (p < .12) to £l2 - .12 (p < .02) 
indicating that union representation does indeed vitiate 
the relationship between task interdependence and internal 
labor market standing.
Given this finding, three other post hoc analyses were 
performed. Because it is theoretically possible (e.g., 
Boswell, 1988; Edwards, 1979) for more than one type of 
market power to simultaneously impact a job's internal 
labor market standing, the significant interactions from 
H2.lc (Table 5), H2.2a (Table 6), and H2.2c (Table 8) were 
retested to determine whether these interactions continued 
to hold when other types of market power were also present.
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This was done by controlling statistically for the effects 
of other market power variables and their interactions with 
task interdependence or jobholder choice.
The first of these post hoc analyses examined the 
possibility that highly interdependent jobs with firm- 
specific skills could also have the advantage of union 
representation. Although Table 1 shows no correlation 
between task interdependence and firm-specific skills (£ = 
.07), the results of the analysis of H2.lc (Table 5) does 
indicate an interaction effect of these variables on 
internal labor market standing. The significant 
correlations between task interdependence and union 
representation (£ = .26) and between firm-specific skills 
and union representation (r = .15) also suggest the 
possibility of simultaneous market power effects.
Thus, a post hoc analysis was performed to determine 
whether the significant task interdependence by firm- 
specific skills interaction reported in Table 5 for H2.lc 
would hold when controlling for task interdependence, union 
representation, and firm-specific skills, as well as the 
interaction between task interdependence and union 
representation. Table 10 presents the results of the 
hierarchical multiple regression used to test this 
possibility. In Step 1, task interdependence, union 
representation, firm-specific skills, and the task 
interdependence by union representation interaction term
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Table 10
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal 
Labor Market Standing on Union Representation,
Task Interdependence, Firm-specific Skills,
Task Interdependence x Union Representation, and
Task Interdependence x Firm- 
(H2.1c, post hoc)
specific Skills
Independent variables Step 1 
0i
Step 2 
02
Main effects
Union representation . 871* .852*
Task interdependence . 112 . 074
Firm-specific skills .270* . 369*
Interaction terms
Task interdependence x
union representation . 106 . 396
Task interdependence x
firm-specific skills . 129
. 154 . 162
.000 . 008
si£ 4,245 5,244
Note. n « 250; *p < .001.
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were entered into the regression equation. In Step 2, the 
task interdependence by firm-specific skills interaction 
term was entered. The interaction term was not significant 
(AR2 = .008, df. = 5/244, p < .13), indicating no effect of 
a task interdependence by firm-specific skills interaction 
on internal labor market standing when a job already has 
the market power advantage of union representation.
Overall, the full equation explained 16.2% of the variance 
in internal labor market standing.
The second of the above described post hoc analyses 
examined the possibility that a job with high levels of 
jobholder choice and union representation could also have 
the advantage of firm-specific skills. The significant 
correlations (Table 1) between firm-specific skills and 
jobholder choice (r = .14), as well as between firm- 
specific skills and union representation (r = .15) also 
suggest the possibility of simultaneous market power 
effects. Thus, a post hoc analysis was also performed to 
determine whether the significant jobholder choice by union 
representation interaction from H2.2a and reported in Table 
6 would hold when controlling for jobholder choice, union 
representation, and firm-specific skills, as well as the 
interaction between jobholder choice and firm-specific 
skills. Table 11 presents the results of the hierarchical 
multiple regression used to test this possibility. In Step 
1, jobnolder choice, union representation, firm-specific
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Table 11
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal 
Labor Market Standing on Jobholder Choice, Union 
Representation, Firm-specific Skills, Jobholder Choice x 
Firm-specific Skills, and Jobholder Choice x union 
Representation (H2.2a, post hoc)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2
02
Main effects
Jobholder choice -.167 -.056
Union representation . 63 If .477*
Firm-specific skills . 608+ . 637+
Interaction terms
Jobholder choice x
firm-specific skills -.350* -.355*
Jobholder choice x
union representation -.400*
E: . 160 . 177
A£‘ - 012 . 017
4 , 245 5,244
Note. n ■ 2 50; *p < .05; +p < .001.
skills, and the jobholder choice by firm-specific skills 
interaction term were entered into the equation. In Step 
2, the jobholder choice by union representation interaction 
term was entered. The interaction was significant (AEa = 
.017, df = 5/244, p < .03), indicating a consistent effect 
of a jobholder choice by union representation interaction 
on internal labor market standing even when the job in 
question already has the market power advantage associated 
with firm-specific skills. Overall, the full equation 
explained 17.7% of the variance in internal labor market 
standing.
Finally, to further examine the possibility that more 
than one type of market power can impact a job's internal 
labor market standing simultaneously, the significant 
jobholder choice by firm-specific skills interaction from 
H2.2c and reported in Table 8 was also retested after 
controlling for the effects of jobholder choice, union 
representation, and firm-specific skills, as well as the 
interaction between jobholder choice and union 
representation. Table 12 presents the results of the 
hierarchical multiple regression used to test this 
possibility. In Step 1, jobholder choice, union 
representation, firm-specific skills, and the jobholder 
choice by union representation interaction term were 
entered into the regression equation. In Step 2, the 
jobholder choice by firm-specific skills interaction term
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Table 12
Coefficients from Hierarchical Regression of Internal 
Labor Market Standing on Jobholder Choice, Union 
Representation, Firm-specific Skills, Jobholder Choice 
x Union Representation, and Jobholder Choice x Firm- 
specific Skills (H2.2c, post hoc)
Independent variables Step 1 Step 2
02
Main effects
Jobholder choice . 040 056
Union representation . 603f .477*
Firm-specific skills .316* .637*
Interaction terms
Jobholder choice x
union representation -.396* -.400*
Jobholder choice x
firm-specific skills -.355*
E1 . 164 . 177
LE2 . 016 .013
d£ 4 , 245 5,244
Note, n * 250; *p < .05; +p < .01; *p < .001.
was entered. The interaction was significant =* .013,
df = 5/244, e < *05)f indicating a consistent effect of a 
jobholder choice by firm-specific skills interaction on 
internal labor market standing even when the job in 
question already has the market power advantage associated 
with union representation. Overall, the full equation 
explained 17.7% of the variance in internal labor market 
standing.
5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results of the data 
analysis outlined in Chapter 4, as well as various post hoc 
investigations. Limitations of the study, discussion of 
these results, and directions for future research will be 
provided in the following chapter.
Chapter 6 
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter is divided into four major sections:
(1) overview of the research, (2) discussion of empirical 
findings, (3) study contributions, and (4) study 
limitations and directions for future research.
6.1 Overview
This study examined the nature of internal labor 
markets from a job-level perspective. It investigated the 
relationship of job-level technology variables (i.e., task 
interdependence and jobholder choice) to internal labor 
markets by specifically examining which features 
differentiate jobs that are and are not included in such 
structures. The relationship of power variables (e.g., 
firm-specific skills) to internal labor markets was also 
tested. As with job technology variables, the study looked 
particularly at what power characteristics differentiate 
jobs that are and are not included in internal labor 
markets. The covariance between the above technology and 
power variables was studied as well. Finally, the research 
investigated how the combined influence of technology and 
power relate to the presence of internal labor markets. 
Specifically, the study tested for interactions between 
technology and power variables to determine whether jobs
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with these effects were more often found in internal labor 
markets.
To some extent this study was exploratory in that much 
of the previous research into the development of internal 
labor markets has been done at a more macro-level of 
analysis (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978; Edwards,
1979; Sonnenfeld 4 Peiperl, 1988). It was contended that a 
better understanding of the nature of internal labor 
markets has been hindered by an almost exclusive dependence 
on such macro-level variables as sectors, industries, and 
business-level strategies.
The reported research was undertaken in the belief 
that a more complete understanding of internal labor 
markets would be possible through an examination of the 
technological components of those jobs that are found in 
internal labor markets. The relative power of workplace 
participants to define their jobs was also considered to be 
an important element in the development of internal labor 
markets.
6.2 Discussion of Research Findings
The nonsignificant results for two of the hypotheses 
involving professional jobs (i.e., H2.1b, H2.2b) provide 
added support for the traditional contention (e.g., 
Williamson, 1981) that professional jobs will not be found 
in internal labor markets. Furthermore, the results of 
hypothesis HI.la confirm Williamson's (1981) and others'
(e.g., Wachter & Wright, 1990) belief that if professional 
jobs are found in an internal labor market, it is due to 
the firm specific nature of the skills required. However, 
these results do not provide evidence contravening 
Boswell's (1988) argument that pseudoprofessional jobs, in 
which employees with general skills form occupational 
associations to protect their jobs and extend their 
autonomy, will also be found in internal labor markets. In 
the current study the DOT classification of professional 
and kindred jobs was used and, thus, no differentiation was 
made between "true" professionals and pseudoprofessionals. 
Therefore, the beliefs of Boswell (1988) and others (e.g., 
Mintzberg, 1983) regarding pseudoprofessional jobs could 
not be tested in this study. Only the interaction effect 
of professional credentials and firm-specific skills 
(HI.la) was directly examined.
Hypothesis H2.la concerning interactions between task 
interdependence, union representation, and internal labor 
market standing (H2.1a) was also not supported.
Ostensibly, this result runs counter to the literature 
regarding unionized jobs and internal labor markets. 
However, there are several possible explanations for this 
outcome. First, there is the question of the proxy measure 
of interdependence employed in this research. The type of 
interdependence most often associated with the presence of 
unions and internal labor markets is serial interdependence
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(e.g., Edwards, 1979), which was fully represented in this 
study. Of the 250 jobs examined, 103 were characterized by 
serial interdependence. However, because the DOT data were 
not collected for the express purpose of undertaking this 
dissertation, the presence of some confound in the proxy 
cannot be ignored. The significant correlation between 
task interdependence and union representation along with 
the positive performance of the task interdependence 
variable in other hypotheses would lead one to conclude 
that this, however, is probably not the primary reason for 
nonsignificant results.
A post hoc analysis using only those jobs with serial 
interdependence again yielded insignificant results for the 
relationship between task interdependence and internal 
labor markets, and the interaction task interdependence and 
union representation was still not significant. However, a 
partial correlation analysis indicated that union 
representation was acting to suppress the relationship 
between task interdependence and internal labor market 
standing- It was found that task interdependence is 
related to internal labor market standing only in unionized 
settings.
A second possible explanation deals with the 
theoretical differences in craft versus industrial unions. 
It has been argued that because industrial unions may often 
represent employees with firm-specific skills and high task
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interdependence that they may also favor internal labor 
market systems (Baron, Davis-Blake, & Bielby, 1986; Finlay, 
1983; Fligstein & Fernandez, 1988; Strang & Baron, 1990; 
Williamson, 1981). In contrast, craft unions, whose 
members' skills are more general, may reject employment 
systems that restrict employee mobility (Baron, Davis- 
Blake, & Bielby, 1986; Caplow, 1954; Fligstein & Fernandez, 
1988; Piore, 1975; Strang & Baron, 1990). In this study no 
distinction was made between these types of union 
representation, although a perusal of the industries 
involved (e.g., aircraft manufacturing, radio and 
television) would suggest that most of the unionized jobs 
in this sample are likely represented by craft unions.
A third, and possibly related, reason for the 
nonsignificant interaction between task interdependence and 
union representation has to do with industries represented 
in the focal sample. Not only are they industries probably 
dominated by unit or craft production, but they are also 
industries in which constant fluctuations in demand may 
lead to unstable employment systems (Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 
1988). Thus, it is also quite possible that a sample drawn 
from other industries in which production is continuous, 
demand is more stable, and industrial unions are more 
heavily represented, would result in a significant 
interaction between task interdependence and the presence 
of union representation.
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As was mentioned above, the task interdependence 
measure performed positively in the other analysis in which 
it was a factor. This finding supports Williamson's (1975) 
and others' (e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Baron, Davis- 
Blake, & Bielby, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi, 1979) 
belief that higher task interdependence not only makes it 
especially important for more senior workers to pass on 
skills to junior workers, but also creates 
'nonseparabilities' or difficulties in monitoring 
individual productivity. When 'nonseparabilities' exist it 
becomes necessary to observe productivity in a piece-meal 
fashion with a final decision as to performance 
acceptability made at some future date. Thus, because 
performance can only be assessed after an otherwise 
unacceptable length of time, rewards are based on seniority 
and, to insure against what Williamson (1981) has referred 
to as employees' "opportunistic behaviors," a firm will 
attempt to tie its interests to that of its employees 
through the creation of internal labor markets. These same 
"opportunistic behaviors" (e.g., peer pressure, production 
stoppages, free riding) represent the exercise of what 
Boswell (1988) and Edwards (1979) have referred to as 
"control over the labor process."
It was argued in Chapter 3 that although high levels 
of task interdependence alone are often enough to protect 
jobholders from a good deal of market competition, leverage
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is limited without some mechanism for restricting the 
supply of replacement labor. Supporting this contention is 
the significant interaction found between task 
interdependence and firm-specific skills. The increased 
control over labor processes represented by high levels of 
task interdependence naturally encourages the development 
of market mechanisms intended to preserve that control.
This should be especially true where conflicting groups 
such as management and labor exist. The reverse is also 
possible in that the market power provided by firm- 
specific skills should allow for the elaboration of labor 
process control. The significant interaction between task 
interdependence and firm-specific skills implies that the 
two are interrelated to the extent that the existence of 
one creates the conditions necessary to the development of 
the other. Finally, however, the post hoc analysis of this 
interaction (see Table 10) indicates that the effect of 
firm-specific skills and task interdependence is not 
operable when other forms of market power exist (i.e., 
union representation).
The second labor process variable, jobholder choice, 
was also found to be significantly related to internal 
labor markets, supporting this study's contention that 
higher levels of worker discretion increase worker control 
over the labor process and lessen the employing firm's 
ability to predict behavior and outcomes. Williamson
(1981) argues that increased uncertainty from worker 
discretion constitutes a problem of bounded rationality in 
which the firm finds it necessary to depend on workers to 
make decisions in its best interest rather than their own. 
In addition to the problem of bounded rationality, 
jobholder choice also entails increases in administrative 
costs. Traditional methods of regulating employee behavior 
such as direct supervision or standardization of processes 
and outputs become increasingly difficult at higher levels 
of discretion. Under these circumstances a firm will 
resort to the use of professionals whose training assures 
ability as well as acceptable behavioral standards, or it 
will choose to train and socialize employees internally.
The latter of these options requires that employees remain 
with the employing firm long enough for training costs to 
be recouped. Ultimately, bounded rationality and excessive 
monitoring costs lead to the development of employment 
systems designed to make employee interests consonant with 
those of the firm and to retain employees over an 
acceptable payback period.
As with task interdependence, it was also argued in 
Chapter 3 that the impact of jobholder choice on 
development of internal labor markets is strongest when the 
market power to reinforce control over the labor process is 
also present. Although this was not found to be the case 
when external market power was in the form of professional
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credentials, interactions between jobholder choice and 
union representation, and jobholder choice and firm- 
specific skills were significant. High levels of choice 
have the potential for raising transaction costs and 
placing primary control of the labor process in the hands 
of workers. And, again, this internal power is greatly 
increased when the presence of unions or firm-specific 
skills restricts a firm's labor supply. Labor/management 
negotiations in cases where both jobholder choice 
engendered labor process control and external market power 
exist should primarily focus on skill preservation and 
autonomy, but when skills are firm-specific will also focus 
on wages and seniority rights. Thus, the interaction of 
jobholder choice and firm-specific skills was found to be 
stronger (p < .01; Table 8) than that between jobholder 
choice and union representation (p < .05; Table 6). 
Moreover, post hoc analyses show that each of these 
combinations of labor process and market power are still 
effective in promoting the development of internal labor 
markets when controlling for other significant variables 
(see Tables 11 & 12).
6.3 Contributions
The purpose of this dissertation was to advance 
understanding of the development of internal labor markets. 
Most studies of internal labor markets have associated 
career mobility and advancement with organizations'
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responses to the characteristics of dual labor markets 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Edwards, 1979), industrial 
sectors (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978; Tolbert,
1982), particular industries (e.g., Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 
1988), and specific firms (e.g., Miles & Snow, 1984 ;
Schuler & Jackson, 1987). A recognition of diversity 
across and within firms, however, suggested the need for a 
closer, more micro examination of internal labor markets.
The results of this dissertation serve as a bridge 
between human capital explanations of mobility and 
advancement and the macro-level explanations of internal 
labor markets mentioned above. They indicate that 
interactions of decisions regarding employment 
arrangements, conflict over definitions of work, and the 
relative power of competing coalitions can have significant 
consequences for individual jobholders. Specifically, 
human capital variables alone are not the only determining 
factors of individual advancement and success. This study 
indicates that for human capital to be of value in 
promoting career mobility and advancement, an individual 
must first gain access to the "right" job or what Edwards 
(1979) has called a "good" job. Employment in particular 
industries (e.g., Sonnenfeld & Peiperl, 1988) or economic 
sectors (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978) is also 
insufficient for mobility and advancement. Although 
previous research (e.g., Beck, Horan, & Tolbert, 1978)
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indicates that some industries or sectors provide better 
opportunities for advancement than others, there is often 
substantial variation in the promotion structures within 
these categories. Again, the Key appears to be a "good" 
job within a particular industry or sector. Thus, this 
research would seem to imply that individual career 
attainment is dependent on the complex interactions of 
multiple variables spanning several levels of analysis.
In practical terms the results of this study suggest 
significant changes in at least two types of decision­
making. First, public-policy makers would do well to 
consider the possibility that unemployment and instability 
in individual employment patterns can not be corrected in 
the long term through creating just any job or providing 
just any training. Eyraud, Marsden, and Silvestre (1990) 
argue that most public retraining programs differ 
substantially from established methods of skill infusion 
used in industry, making it difficult to advance the 
unemployed into skilled jobs. These researchers contend 
that one reason for these difficulties is a reluctance on 
the part of employers to do away with employment 
arrangements that keep workers investing in established 
forms of training, while Cassell (1990) contends that 
employers also have a normative bias against public 
employment services. As noted in this dissertation, these 
employment arrangements serve to restrict the supply of
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replacement workers, and so workers are also inclined to 
defend the investments they have made in their skills.
Thus, this research supports Falk and Lyson's (1988) 
contention that employment problems will continue until 
"good" jobs and skills are created.
Second, although the current research did not examine 
business-leve1 strategies, the results lend themselves to 
some preliminary conclusions regarding the recent call for 
inclusion of human resource practices in a firm's business- 
level plans (e.g., Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991; Ferris, 
et al., 1991; Tichy, Fombrun, & Devanna, 1984) . In 
particular, for human resource practices to become an 
integral part of strategic planning requires more than a 
cursory examination of market conditions and overall 
industrial relations. Instead, the link between such 
practices and business-level planning must extend all the 
way down to the level of job design and beyond to the 
hiring of specific employees. This is especially true if 
recent theoretical attempts to tie human resource practices 
to firm performance are supported by empirical research 
(Butler, Ferris, & Napier, 1991; Ferris et al., 1991). 
Moreover, Cassell (1990) argues that the link between human 
resources practices and strategic planning must fully 
incorporate the strategic notion of change. In particular, 
decision makers must recognize that environmental changes, 
organizational responses to such changes, and the responses
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of individual workers are all continuous interacting 
processes.
6.4 Study Limitations and Future Research Directions
There are at least three limitations evident in this 
dissertation. First, although the sample size in terms of 
number of jobs examined was fairly large, the number of 
industries used was relatively restricted. As was 
discussed previously (Section 6.2), a different set of 
industries with more stable markets and represented by 
industrial rather than craft unions may have produced 
different results.
Second, the use of proxies to measure task 
interdependence and jobholder choice is an acknowledged 
weakness. Although these indicators seem reasonable, and 
Spenner (1990) reports that DOT data compare favorably to 
self-report and other job characteristic measures, anytime 
data are used for some purpose other than that for which 
they were originally collected, validity issues must be 
acknowledged. In the present case, there were measurement 
limitations related to testing various relationships 
involving professional jobs. None of the associated 
hypotheses could be thoroughly tested due to an inability 
to tap pseudoprofessionalism.
Finally, the DOT may contain gender biases, 
particularly in title descriptions and ratings (Miller et 
al., 1980). Spenner (1990), however, reports that
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definitions used in the dictionary's current edition (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1977), and used in this dissertation 
are significantly less biased than previous editions. 
Nevertheless, caution in generalizing the results of this 
research to jobs held predominantly by women may be 
warranted.
A number of extensions to this study are possible, 
some of which address the above limitations. First, a 
study exploring a broader range of industries would help to 
solve problems of generalizabiJity across industries or 
industrial sectors. A larger sample of industries would 
also allow for comparison of the theoretically hypothesized 
different effects that craft and industrial unions have on 
job design and the growth of internal labor markets. 
Moreover, a broader range of industries could be used to 
test Sonnenfeld and Peiperl's (1988) theories concerning 
human resource practices and industry types, as well as the 
connection between such practices and the variables used in 
this study.
Second, it is also possible that a connection exists 
between a firm's chosen strategy and the types of jobs that 
are created by firms. For example, it can be argued that 
firms operating in dynamic and unstable environments will 
attempt to depend on external markets for needed labor 
rather than risk the long-term ties and loss of flexibility 
entailed in the use of internal labor markets (e.g.,
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Cassell, 1990). Furthermore, one of the major determining 
factors regarding strategic performance is the success with 
which a particular strategy is implemented (Porter, 1985).
In discussing occupational labor market (OLM) and 
internal labor market (ILM) responses to changes in demand, 
Eyraud, Marsden, and Silvestre (1990) contend that, 
although OLMs adjust easily to cyclical fluctuations in 
labor demand, they adjust less readily to technical or 
organizational changes. The reason for this difficulty is 
that when general occupational skills are changed to fit 
new technical or organizational needs, they almost 
necessarily become more firm-specific and thus less 
transferable. In contrast, ILMs adjust quite easily to 
changing requirements inside the firm, but not to 
increasing unemployment. Moreover, any change away from 
established ground rules (e.g., employment security, worker 
autonomy) is likely to create conflict over definitions of 
work (e.g., Benson, 1977; Scott, 1987). Thus, in terms of 
both business-level strategies and human resource 
practices, a firm's environment and its relative dependence 
on general occupational skills or firm-specific skills may 
have significant consequences for successful strategy 
implementation. For example, although not a direct test of 
the relationship between these skill types and strategy 
implementation, Ferris et al. (1991) did find a significant 
relationship between human resource practices, strategic
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planning, and firm performance. The question thus arises, 
"Do successful firms more accurately match their business- 
level strategies to their internal labor markets than their 
less successful counterparts?".
Finally, this study highlights the need for further 
development of task interdependence (Gerwin, 1979) and 
professional measures. Those measures of interdependence 
available in the literature are generally only one item 
(e.g., Hrebiniak, 1974; Mohr, 1971; Van de Ven & Delbecq, 
1974) and fail to completely capture the contextual 
differences implied by Thompson's (1967) discussion of 
serial, mediating, and intensive technologies. For 
example, the negative relationship between discretion and 
interdependence proposed by Thompson (1967) is intuitively 
appealing. However, there are instances in which a 
significant decline in discretion as a result of increasing 
interdependence does not necessarily make sense. An 
example is when an intensive technology requiring high 
interdependence involves raw materials that are highly 
variable and unstable and thus requires high employee 
discretion as well. To overcome these sorts of problems, 
an empirical distinction between Thompson's three forms of 
task interdependence are needed. Pearce and Gregerson 
(1991) have recently begun work in this area by developing 
an individual-level measure that distinguishes between 
serial and reciprocal task interdependence.
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Beyond questions of interdependence and discretion, 
such generalized measures of interdependence make detailed, 
substantive examination of the relationship between job 
technologies and other variables such as craft versus 
industrial unions difficult. Pearce and Gregerson (1991) 
argue that even the most widely used measure of task 
interdependence developed by Van de Ven, Delbecq, and 
Koenig (1976) has significant problems. First, it is 
constructed to gather information at the level of 
departments or work groups. Thus, use of the measure for 
individual- or job-level analyses leads to aggregation 
error. As was noted throughout this dissertation 
technologies are seldom homogeneous across firms or within 
departments. Pearce and Gregerson also note that, unlike 
Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig's (1976) measure,
Thompson's (1967) conception of technological 
interdependence is based on a Guttman scale. For Thompson, 
each higher level of interdependence included all lower 
levels. Although the DOT measure of interaction with 
people suffers from neither of the above problems, it is 
also an inexact measure of task interdependence.
Similar problems plague studies of professional­
ization. As with task interdependence, the methods of 
measuring professional jobs have not kept pace with 
theoretical developments. Typically, researchers employ 
one of many lists (e.g., Dingwall & Lewis, 1981; Freidson,
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1970; Hall, 1975; Kerr, Von Glinow, & Schriesheim, 1977) of
professional characteristics for classifying jobs as 
professional, semi-professional, non-professional and so 
on. Hall (1975), for example, states that professions are 
distinguished by work autonomy, a continually updated 
knowledge base, internal regulation, and codes of ethics. 
Similarly, Kerr, Von Glinow, and Schriesheim (1977) suggest 
that professionals are characterized by expert knowledge, 
autonomy, commitment to their work, identification with 
their profession, codes of ethics, and peer censure. 
Benveniste (1987) has compiled these and almost twenty 
other definitions to produce the following six structural 
criteria: (1) application of skills based on special
knowledge; (2) requirements for advanced education and 
training; (3) some formal testing of competence and 
control; (4) existence of professional associations; (5) 
the existence of codes of conduct or ethics; and (6) the 
existence of an accepted commitment or calling, or sense of 
responsibility for serving the public. The existence of an 
accepted commitment or calling to serve the public is 
actually an attitudinal construct and, thus, should
probably be excluded from a list designed to classify jobs
rather than individuals. The remaining five items do,
however, represent common structural aspects of
professional jobs, and can readily be used to examine 
various jobs.
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In this dissertation, DOT classifications reflecting 
many of the above criteria were available for use in making 
distinctions between professional and non-professional 
jobs, but dividing those jobs classified as professional 
into sub-groups of pseudo- or semi-professional was 
impossible. Solving this particular problem and that of 
classifying non-DOT jobs as professional or non­
professional requires more than a listing of 
characteristics. One possibility for future research is a 
study aimed toward assessing the relative importance of 
professionalism criteria. Once such assessment has been 
made and relevant criteria weighted, summation scores 
similar to those used in point systems of job evaluation 
(see, e.g., Blegen, Mueller, & Price, 1988) might be 
employed to determine the degree to which a job is 
professionalized.
In sum, this dissertation has hopefully furthered 
understanding of internal labor markets by: (1)
empirically exploring internal labor markets from a job- 
level perspective, (2) comparing and contrasting the 
influence of power variables and job-level technology 
variables on a job's inclusion in an internal labor market, 
and (3) considering the degree to which job-level 
technology and power variables combine to determine the 
existence of internal labor markets.
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DOT Code Legend
Professional & Kindred
Clerical/Sales ......
Service Work ........
Process Work ........
Machine Work .........
Benchwork ............
Structural Work .....
Miscellaneous .......
000-199
200-299
300-399
500-599
600-699
700-799
800-899
900-999
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DOT 
002 , 
002 ,
002 ,
002 . 
003 .
003 .
007 . 
007 .
007 .
012 . 
012 . 
019.
019.
02 0. 
020 . 
029. 
074.
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Code
.061-030 
061-026
.061-022
280-010 
167-030
, 167-034
,167-022 
261
262
167
187-010
062
281-010
061-640
267
261-010
131-010
Job Title 
STRESS ANALYST 
AERONAUTICAL- 
RESEARCH ENGINEER 
AERONAUTICAL- 
DESIGN ENGINEER 
RESEARCH MECHANIC 
ENGINEER-IN-CHARGE,
STUDIO OPERATIONS 
ENGINEER-IN-CHARGE, 
TRANSMITTER 
TOOL-DRAWING CHECKER 
SOLVENT RECOVERY 
TECHNICAL SPECIALIST 
COMPUTER-NUMERICAL-CONTROL 
(CNC) NESTING OPERATOR 
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF MIS 
MATERIAL SCHEDULER 
DIRECTOR OF SYSTEMS 
DEVELOPMENT/TELECOM 
CALIBRATION LABORATORY 
TECHNICIAN 
SOFTWARE ENGINEER 
OPERATIONS COORDINATOR 
LABORATORY TESTER 
DIRECTOR, PHARMACY SERVICES
Classification
Prof & Kindred
EQX
074
074
075 
075 
075
075
076 
076
076
076
076
076.
076. 
078.
078.
078.
078.
129
Code Job Title Classification
,161-010 PHARMACIST Prof & Kindred
,387-010 PHARMACY TECHNICIAN "
,117-022 DIRECTOR, NURSING SERVICE "
,127-022 NURSE, SUPERVISOR "
,3 61 IV THERAPIST; "
IV THERAPY NURSE 
.374-010 NURSE, GENERAL DUTY "
,107-010 SPEECH PATHOLOGIST "
117-010 COORDINATOR OF "
REHABILITATION SERVICES 
121-014 PHYSICAL THERAPIST "
121 EXERCISE PHYSIOLOGIST "
124 AQUATICS SPECIALIST; "
RECREATIONAL THERAPIST 
131 PHYSICAL THERAPY MANAGER "
(DIRECTOR)
224-010 PHYSICAL THERAPIST ASST. "
131 SUPERVISOR, CYTOGENETIC "
LABORATORY
131 MANAGER, CYTOGENETIC "
LABORATORY
131 CHIEF OPHTHALMIC "
TECHNICIAN
132 CHIEF POLYSOMNOGRAPHIC "
TECHNICIAN
DOT
078,
078 . 
078,
078 . 
078 . 
078 . 
078 . 
078 . 
078 . 
078 .
078 .
078 .
078 .
078.
078 .
078.
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Code Job.Title Classification
,231 PHIRESIS TECHNICAL Prof & Kindred
SPECIALIST; MEDICAL 
,261 CYTOGENETIC TECHNOLOGIST II "
.261 MEDICAL RADIATION
DOSIMETRIST 
,261 CYTOGENETIC TECHNOLOGIST I "
361 EYE BANK TECHNICIAN "
361 OPHTHALMIC TECHNICIAN "
3 62 CT TECHNOLOGIST "
362 SLEEP DISORDER TECHNICIAN "
,362 STRESS TECHNICIAN "
,362 POLYSOMNOGRAPHIC "
TECHNICIAN
,362 ECHOCATDIOGRAPH "
TECHNICIAN
,362 RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGIST I, ,r
SPECIAL PROCEDURES 
,362 RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGIST, "
MAMMOGRAM
3 62 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHIC "
TECHNOLOGIST III 
362 RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGIST II, "
SPECIAL PROCEDURES 
362 ELECTROMYOGRAPH TECHNICIAN "
BOX
078
078
078
078
078
079
079
079
079
079
079
079
110
131
131
132 
132
131
Code Job Title
,362 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
TECHNOLOGIST I, (MRI)
,3 62 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
TECHNOLOGIST II, (MRI)
,3 62 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
TECHNICIAN (CT)
362 RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGIST,
SPECIAL PROCEDURES CT 
,362 POLYSOMNOGRAPHIC
TECHNOLOGIST 
067 DIRECTOR, SLEEP
DISORDERS CENTER 
137 TUMOR REGISTRY MANAGER
,167-014 MEDICAL RECORD
ADMINISTRATOR 
,167 DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL
RECORDS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 
367-014 MEDICAL RECORD TECHNICIAN
,367 TUMOR REGISTRAR
,374-014 NURSE, LICENSED PRACTICAL
,107-010 LAWYER
267-018 REPORTER
267-010 NEWSCASTER
167 ASSISTANT NEWS EDITOR
267-014 EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Classification
Prof & Kindred
132
d o t code 
143.062-022
143
159
159
159
159
159
159 ,
160 , 
161. 
165.
362
117-010
117-010
117
137
147-014
147-010
167-010
117-010
067-010
166.117-018
166.167-022 
169.137
183.117-014
184.167-022
186.117-014
187.117-010 
189.012
193.262-026 
194.262
ilQfe. Title 
CAMERA OPERATOR,
TELEVISION
OPHTHALMIC PHOTOGRAPHER
PRODUCER
RADIO PRODUCER
COORDINATING PRODUCER
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER/NEWS
DISK JOCKEY
ANNOUNCER
ACCOUNTANT
BUDGET OFFICER
PUBLIC-RELATIONS
REPRESENTATIVE
MANAGER, PERSONNEL
MANAGER, COMPENSATION
DIRECTOR OF CAPTION CENTER
PRODUCTION SUPERINTENDENT
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS,
BROADCAST
CONTROLLER
ADMINISTRATOR, HOSPITAL 
DIRECTOR OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
RADIO STATION OPERATOR 
MASTER CONTROL ENGINEER
Classification
Prof & Kindred
D9T Cgfle 
194.360
194.382 
196.263-042 
199.162
199.167
199.382
201.362-030
202.382
203.362
203.382
206.367-014
206.367-010
209.387-030 
209.587-026
213.362-010
213.362
213.382-010
214.362-026
214.362-022
216.382-022
216.482-010
216.482-010
216.482-010
Job Title
VIDEO TAPE ENGINEER 
STUDIO ENGINEER 
TEST PILOT
PRODUCTION COORDINATOR 
BROADCAST COORDINATOR 
TRAFFIC COORDINATOR 
SECRETARY 
STENOCAPTIONER 
CAPTION TECHNICIAN 
CAPTION WRITER 
FILE CLERK II 
ENGINEERING-DOCUMENT- 
CONTROL CLERK 
PROOFREADER 
MAIL CLERK 
COMPUTER OPERATOR 
PATTERN DATA OPERATOR 
COMPUTER-PERIPHERAL- 
EQUIPMENT OPERATOR 
INVOICE-CONTROL CLERK 
INSURANCE CLERK 
BUDGET CLERK
ACCOUNTS-RECEIVABLE CLERK 
CASH-POSTING CLERK 
ACCOUNTS-PAYABLE CLERK
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Classification
Prof & Kindred
II
II
t l
I t
II
Clerical/Sales
II
II
II
II
II
11
II
II
II
t l
II
H
II
II
II
I
134
DOT Code Job Title Classification
221.164 CUSTOMER SERVICE Clerical/Sales
OPERATOR
221.167 CUSTOMER/PRODUCTION "
MANAGER; PRODUCTION MANAGER
221.167-014 MATERIAL COORDINATOR "
221.167 PRODUCTION COORDINATOR "
221.367-014 ESTIMATOR, PRINTING "
222.387-058 STOCK CLERK "
229.267-010 PARTS CATALOGER "
229.364 INK PREP TECHNICIAN "
235.662-022 TELEPHONE OPERATOR "
239.367 INFORMATION SPECIALIST "
239.677-010 MESSENGER, COPY "
245.362-010 MEDICAL-RECORD CLERK "
254.357-018 SALES REPRESENTATIVE, "
PRINTING
259.357-018 SALES REPRESENTATIVE, "
RADIO AND TELEVISION TIME
269.167-010 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT '*
269.167-034 MANAGER, OFFICE "
321.137-010 HOUSEKEEPER Service Work
32 3.687-010 CLEANER, HOSPITAL "
355.354-010 PHYSICAL THERAPY AIDE "
355.674-014 NURSE AIDE "
500.685 UTILITY WORKER Process Work
DQZ
509
550
550
550
552
559
573
590
590
590
599
603
603 .
603.
605.
605.
606.
135
Code Job Title Classification
,665 SET-UP III Process Work
.381 PAINT MIXING ATTENDANT; "
PAINT TINTER 
.382-022 MIXING-MACHINE OPERATOR «
.685 DISPERSION TECHNICIAN; "
MEDIA PROCESS TECHNICIAN 
.382 SOLVENT RECOVERY OPERATOR "
.132 SHIFT SUPERVISOR, "
DISPERSION
,684-014 SETTER "
.3 62 AUTOMATED AUTOCLAVE OPERATOR *'
,585 TESTER, ADJUSTER CRYSTAL "
PLATES (GRADE 34)
68 5 OVEN TENDER "
685 AUTOMATED SMALL PARTS
PAINTER
,382 MILLED SPAR SANDING Machine Work
MACHINE OPERATOR 
685-062 GRINDER OPERATOR, "
PRODUCTION
685 PARTS FABRICATION MECHANIC "
682-018 ROUTER OPERATOR, RADIAL "
685 TRIMATIC SANDER OPERATOR "
382 ROTARY SHAPER OPERATOR "
136
DOT Code
606.382
615.482-022
616.685-014 
617.682-014
619.360
621.221-010 
621.261
621.281-014
650.132-010 
650.582-018
651.686
651.686
651.686
651.686
653.360
653.382
653.662-010
653.685-010
659.686
Job Title Classification
ASSEMBLER-INSTALLER; Machine Work
STRUCTURES; AUTOMATIC FLOOR 
PUNCH PRESS OPERATOR I "
CLINCHING-MACHINE OPERATOR "
BUMPER OPERATOR "
SPAR ASSEMBLY TOOL OPERATOR "
FIELD-SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE "
OPERATIONAL TEST MECHANIC; "
LINE SPECIALIST
AIRFRAME-AND-POWER-PLANT ”
MECHANIC
SUPERVISOR, TYPESETTING "
PHOTOCOMPOSING-MACHINE "
OPERATOR
FEEDER "
ROLLSETTER "
ROLL TENDER "
LITHO FLOORHELPER "
BINDERY LEADPERSON "
COLLATOR OPERATOR, "
ADVANCED
SADDLE-STITCHING-MACHINE "
OPERATOR
BINDERY WORKER "
JOGGER "
COX
673
673
686
690
690
690
690
692
692
693 
699
699.
699 .
609 .
699.
137
_£sadfi Job Title Classification
>3 60 MACHINE SETTER - Machine Work
CRYSTAL CUT, GRIND 
.685 TEST EQUIPMENT OPERATOR, "
CRYSTAL PLATING 
.362 GERBER CUTTER OPERATOR; "
COMPOSITE WORKER 
.135 SUPERVISOR, SLIT/PUNCH "
.485 SLITTING MACHINE OPERATOR «
,68 5 BURNISHER '•
.68 5 PUNCHER "
3 64 OPERATOR IV "
482-010 CARBON-AND-GRAPHITE- "
BRUSH-MACHINE OPERATOR
280-010 FORM BUILDER "
132 CREW CHIEF: "
COMPOSITE TRIM AND DRILL 
137 FLEXIBLE MACHINING SYSTEM "
(FMS) MANAGER 
3 60 NUMERICAL CONTROL "
MACHINE MACHINIST (FMS)
380 SHEET METAL NUMERICAL "
CONTROL OPERATOR 
360 FLEXIBLE MACHINING SYSTEM "
(FMS) OPERATOR
QQ3L 
699 ,
699 .
699, 
699 .
699 .
699 . 
699 .
705.
706. 
719 . 
721. 
726 . 
726 . 
726 .
726.
726.
726 .
138
-Code Job Title Classification
.362 WATER ROUTER OPERATOR; Machine Work
WATER KNIFE OPERATOR 
382 BONDED STRUCTURE PREFIT "
& LAYUP MAN 
.382 COMPOSITE TRIM/DRILL WORKER "
,382 AUTOMATED GRAPHITE CUTTING "
MACHINE OPERATOR 
382 NUMERICAL CONTROL WIRE "
PREPARATION MACHINE 
,685 SLITTER OPERATOR "
68 6 OPERATOR II "
,684 SMOOTH & BURR WORKER - Benchwork
SHEET METAL 
,681-010 PRECISION ASSEMBLER, BENCH "
381 BLOCK MAKER "
684-014 ASSEMBLER, CARBON BRUSHES "
130-010 SUPERVISOR, ELECTRONICS "
281-014 ELECTRONICS TESTER I
3 64 CHECKER PROCESS - "
SAMPLE CRYSTAL UNITS 
682-022 FUNCTIONAL TESTER, "
PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 
684 INSPECTOR - VISUAL AND "
MECHANICAL
684 MEDIA INSPECTOR; CNC INSPEC. *'
cex
726
726
726
726
726
726
726
728
729
759
777
806
806
806
806
806
806
806
139
Code Job Title Classification
684-086 PRODUCTION REPAIRER, Benchwork
PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD
684-018 ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLER "
684 TESTING TECHNICIAN, "
COATING LINE
685 TESTER, SPECIAL PRECISION "
CRYSTALS (GRADE 36)
685-014 AUTOMATIC COMPONENT "
INSERTION OPERATOR
685-560 MAGNETIC TAPE COATER "
685-014 AUTOMATIC COMPONENT "
INSERTION OPERATOR 
384-010 ASSEMBLER, ELEC. WIRE "
381 ASSEMBLER-SPECIAL "
PRECISION CRYSTALS 
687 BAGGER; COMPO BOND WORKER "
381-030 PATTERNMAKER, PLASTER "
287-010 SALVAGE INSPECTOR Structural
361-022 INSPECTOR, FABRICATION "
361 INSTALLER, INTER ASSEMBLIES *'
381-042 CABLE ASSEMBLER, MOCK-UP *'
3 81 AIRCRAFT MECHANIC. FUEL CELL "
381 PLUMBER, AIRPLANE "
3 82 OPERATOR A, BONDING EQUIP; "
COMPUTER CONTROLLED
DOT.
806
806 - 
806 ,
806.
806 , 
806 .
806.
806. 
806. 
807 .
815.
819.
828.
860.
899.
920.
920.
921.
140
Classification
Structural
Code Job Title
.382 AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLER,
STRUCTURES
.382 OPERATOR A, BONDING EQUIP "
.382 NUMERICAL CONTROL TAPE "
LAYING MACHINE 
.382 FILAMENT WINDING MACHINE "
OPERATOR; FILAMENT WINDER 
.382 COMPOSITE TRIM WORKER "
681 COMPOSITES FABRICATOR "
& ASSEMBLER 
.684 COMPOSITE LAYUP WORKER; *'
LAMINATOR
684 COMPOSITE WORKER; LAYUP "
684-030 ASSEMBLER, METAL BONDING "
3 61 PLASMA SPRAY SKIN rr
REPAIR MECHANIC 
682-010 LASER BEAM CUTTER "
685 MACHINE OPERATOR "
(MASS SOLDERING)
281-010 ELECTRONICS MECHANIC "
3 81-02 2 CARPENTER "
381-010 MAINTENANCE REPAIRER, BLDG. "
587-018 WRAPPER AND PRESERVER Miscellaneous 
587-018 PACKAGER, HAND "
685-026 CONVEYOR TENDER "
141
DOT Code Job Title Classification
929.665 OPERATOR II Miscellaneous
962.167-014 PROGRAM ASSISTANT II
962.264-010 EDITOR, FILM II
962.362-014 LIGHT TECHNICIAN II
962.684-014 GRIP 11
972.281 STRIPPER 11
972 .281 NEGATIVE PREP ENGINEER 1t
972.282 GERBER OPERATOR 1
972.284 QUALITY CONTROL 1
972.367 PLATE INSPECTOR II
972.381 NEGATIVE PREP PLATER II
972.381 PLATE MAKER VI
972.382-014 PHOTOGRAPHER, LITHOGRAPHIC "
972 . 382 NEGATIVE PREP OPERATOR II
972.687 PLATE CHECKER II
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A COMPLETED DOT JOB ANALYSIS SCHEDULE 
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Department of Management
Rebecca G. Long 
Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Management 
Louisiana State University
142
143
JOB ANALYSIS SCHEDULE
ESTB SN: 
JAR SN: 
JAR TYPE:
DOT TITLE: 
IND DESIG: 
DOT CODE:
44
64
B
CNC Nesting Operator 
#
007.262
SIC CATEGORY: 
SIC CODE: 
SOC CODE: 
GOE CODE:
123
3721
3974
05.01.06
WORK PERFORMED ESTIMATES
WORKER FUNCTIONS Data: 2S
People: 6N
Things: 2S
WORK FIELDS 1: 057
2 : 241
3: 233
MPSMS 1: 568
2 : 592
3: 0
WORKER CHARACTERISTICS ESTIMATES
GED Reasoning: 4
Math: 3
Language: 3
SVP: 6
APTITUDES Enter Value 1-5 for each: 
G 3 
V 3 
N 3 
S 2 
P 3 
Q 3 
K 4 
F 3 
M 4 
E 5 
C 5
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TEMPERAMENTS: T
INTERESTS: 5,6
JOB COMPLEXITY:
PHYSICAL DEMANDS
LEVEL: S
FACTORS: 8,9,10,12,13,15,18
ENVIR. CONDITIONS:
DATE PREPARED: 03-17-89
ESTABLISHMENT JOB TITLE: Computer-Numerical-Control (CNC)
Nesting Operator
JOB SUMMARY:
Lays out original nests of sheet stock, parts, or materials 
for CNC routing, drilling, or other fabricating machine 
operations to maximize utilization of materials and 
minimize machine setups and operations, using computerized 
nesting equipment, applying knowledge of nesting systems 
and CNC machine operation.
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS:
1. Lays out nesting pattern: Reviews shop orders to
determine job specifications and nesting requirements.
Sorts shop orders into groups according to compatibility of 
parts to be machined, considering such factors as quantity 
and shape of parts, and type, size, alloy, and gauge of 
material to be machined. Enters commands into computerized 
equipment to retrieve part data from permanent files. 
Displays parts to be nested on display unit, and rotates, 
moves, and manipulates parts on display screen to produce 
most efficient and producible nest, using data tablet, 
stylus, and function box. Enters commands to enter machine 
controlling criteria, such as table movement, cutting and 
drilling tool specifications, spindle location, machine 
starting point, feed rate, and machine speed, utilizing 
knowledge of machine operation. Enters commands to title 
and store nest layouts in computer memory. Enters commands 
to transfer nest data, listings, or layouts to other media, 
such as hardcopy, tape, or floppy disk, or enters commands 
to route nest data to machines by direct link. Enters 
commands to retrieve, revise, correct, or reformat prior 
nests or data listings and to build source files. (90%)
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2. Performs other duties: Loads and unloads disk packs,
tapes, or floppy disks. Operates digitizing equipment to 
produce pattern from existing data as requested. Consults 
with Machine Operators and other authorized personnel to 
resolve machining/nesting problems. (10%)
EMPLOYER REQUIREMENTS
FORMAL EDUC: #
LENGTH
VOCATIONAL PREPARATION #D=Days
#W=Weeks, #M=Mths, #Y=Yrs
COLLEGE:
#
VOC. ED:
#
APPRENT:
#
INPLANT:
#
OJT:
1Y
OTHER: numerical control machine operation
1Y
EXPERIENCE/CERTIFICATION
EXPERIENCE: one year machine operation
LICENSES: #
RELATION TO OTHER JOBS AND WORKERS
PROMOTION FROM: CNC Machine Operator
PROMOTION TO: #
SUPERVISION RCV'D: Supervisor
SUPERVISION GIVEN: #
MACHINES, TOOLS, EQUIPMENT, AND WORK AIDS:
Nesting equipment (manufacturer unknown): Floor-mounted,
electrically-powered, computer workstation consisting of 
display unit, keyboard, data tablet, stylus and function 
box; digitizer; disk packs; tapes; floppy disks; hardcopy 
patterns; shop orders.
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MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS:
Machine control media used as pattern for cutting aircraft 
parts.
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
Nest: computer-generated pattern of parts to be machined 
arranged in optimum location to achieve maximum utilization 
of materials and minimum set up and operation of machines.
GENERAL COMMENTS:
#
*** PHYSICAL DEMANDS ***
1. STRENGTH
Enter percentage Standing/Walking/Sitting:
a) Standing 5%
Walking 5%
Sitting 90%
b) Enter weights for appropriate activities:
Activity Not Present Occasionally Frequently 
Lifting 0-5
Carrying 0-5
Pushing N
Pulling N
C) CONTROLS: Y or N
Hand-Arm Y
Right
Left
Both Y
Either
Foot-Leg N
Right
Left
Both
Either
d) Strength Level: S
Frequency (N,0,F or C) and Criticality (C or N) - ie. 
NN, FC, etc.
2 . Climb NN
3 . Balance NN
4 . Stoop NN
5. Kneel NN
6. Crouch NN
7 . Crawl NN
8 . Reach FC
9 . Handle OC
10 . Finger FC
11. Feel NN
12 . Talk OC
13. Hear OC
14 . Smell NN
15 . Near Acuity FC
16 . Far Acuity NN
17 . Depth Perception NN
18 . Accommodation FC
19 . Color Vision NN
20. Field of Vision NN
*** PHYSICAL DEMANDS COMMENTS ***
la. Sits to operate nesting equipment. Stands and walks 
operate digitizer and to obtain supplies or work aids.
lb. Lifts and carries printouts, supplies, diskpacks, 
tapes, floppy disks, and other work aids weighing from 
negligible to 5 lbs. Exerts negligible pushing/pulling 
force to press keys on nesting equipment keyboard and 
function box and to manipulate stylus, and to operate 
digitizer.
lc. Uses fingers of both hands-arms to operate controls 
computerized nesting equipment and digitizer, such as 
knobs, keys, and switches.
8 & 10. Reaches for and fingers computer and peripheral 
equipment controls, such as keys and stylus.
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9. Handles hardcopy patterns, shop orders, and other work 
aids.
12 & 13. Discusses machining/nesting problems with Machine 
Operators or other authorized personnel to resolve 
problems.
15 & 18. Reads and follows shop orders, pattern data, and 
other technical information to layout nest on computer 
display screen, frequently shifting gaze from computer 
screen to written data.
*** ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ***
Frequency (N,0,F or C) and Criticality (C or N), - ie. NN,
FC, etc.
1. Exposure to Weather NN
2. Extreme Cold NN
3. Extreme Heat NN
4. Wet/Humid NN
5. Noise (Decibels) 80
6. Vibration NN
7. Atmospheric Cond. NN
HAZARDS Frequency (NN or PC)
8. Moving Mech. Parts NN
9. Electric Shock NN
10. High, Exposed Places NN
11. Radiant Energy NN
12. Explosives NN
13. Toxic/Caustic Chem. NN
14. Other NN
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS COMMENTS:
5. Noise from computer operation in office setting, and 
from cutting and drilling machines in adjacent factory 
area.
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING/DEVICES:
safety glasses
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NARRATIVE REPORT 
Establishment No. 4 4 
SIC: 3721
aircraft mfg.
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this establishment study was to verify 
the accuracy of the published aircraft-aerospace 
manufacturing definitions in the 4th Edition of the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
Company Background 
This company was founded in 1916 and began building 
flying boats for the U.S. Navy under a U.S. Navy World War 
I contract. To handle its expanding production, the firm 
moved from its original location to larger quarters in 
southern California. However, the worldwide Great 
Depression that came after the 1929 stock market crash 
closed the doors of the company.
In 1932, the company was reorganized. During World 
War II, more than 19,000 aircraft poured out of its plants. 
Since that time, the company has continued to grow and 
diversify.
Today, the company builds spacecraft and space 
systems, strategic missiles, airlifters, antisubmarine 
warfare and special mission aircraft, tactical weapon
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systems, electronic systems, and ships, and provides 
technical, financial, information, and management services.
Because the company primarily builds military 
aircraft, and much of the research, design, fabrication, 
and testing of these aircraft is accomplished in restricted 
areas and under tight security, the study was limited in 
the number of jobs observed and workers interviewed.
Manufacturing Organization 
Manufacturing Control
The Manufacturing Control Department provides time 
standards, manpower allocations, detailed production 
schedules, and production analysis. The Fabrication 
Control and Assembly Control Divisions are responsible for 
order writing, diversion of parts, expediting, and stock 
control. Industrial Engineering is included in this 
Department and is responsible for providing standard 
systems and procedures, statements of functions and 
responsibilities, and manufacturing support.
Manufacturing Engineering
This Department encompasses Manufacturing Planning, 
Plant Engineering, and Tooling. Manufacturing Planning 
converts the blueprints provided by Engineering to 
manufacturing assembly parts lists, shop orders, and tool 
requirement breakdowns. The Tooling Division designs and 
produces jigs, fixtures, templates, and other related 
tooling required by the shop orders. Plant Engineering
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provides and maintains space, machinery, and equipment to 
accomplish the manufacturing processes.
Manufacturing Research Engineering
This Department provides research into advanced 
manufacturing technologies, test equipment engineering and 
assembly, and manufacturing process and producibility 
research.
Fabrication
This Department is broken down into four main 
divisions *
1) Machine Shops & Sheet Metal Fabrication Division 
includes the following operations: conventional 
machine shop, numerical control programming and 
machine shop, metal fittings and processing, 
welding subassembly, model shop, sheet metal 
fabrication, and painting/processing.
2) Production Development & Modification includes 
research and design of developmental functional and 
structural parts and assemblies.
3) Electrical L Avionics Fabrication includes the 
fabrication of electrical parts and subassemblies, 
as well as development and manufacturing of 
avionics components and systems.
4) Subassembly includes bonded parts fabrication and 
assembly, plastic parts fabrication and assembly, 
and sheet metal subassembly.
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Assembly
The Assembly Department encompasses the following 
operations:
1) The Assembly Division is responsible for assembling 
parts and assemblies into major subassemblies and 
structures, such as fuselage, wing, and empennage, 
performing mating operations of major sections, and 
trimming.
2) The Final Assembly & Flight Line Division is 
responsible for final installation of parts and 
assemblies on the aircraft, systems installation 
and checkout, final interior and exterior painting 
of the aircraft, and flight testing.
Quality Control
The Quality Control Department maintains control of 
product quality through inspection of materials, parts, and 
finished product, during all phases of manufacturing, to 
ensure that engineering specifications are met.
Material
The Material Department converts design data into 
material requirements; purchases and stores raw material 
and purchased parts; transports materials, parts and 
finished products; and ships and receives parts, materials, 
and aircraft equipment.
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Advanced Technology
The manufacturing branch of this establishment is 
stepping up automation and robotic machinery installation 
in an attempt to increase their competitive capability.
They are moving toward a "factory of the future", however 
this is presently in the planning stages. The proposed 
manufacturing plans include:
1) Automated aircraft assembly, utilizing robotic 
assembly techniques including automated storage, 
supervisory computers, programmable assembly 
fixtures, automatic tool changing, simulation 
using artificial intelligence, and CADAM 
(computer aided design/automated manufacturing) 
generated data ;
2) Flexible manufacturing system/distributed 
numerical control program to upgrade the 
company's machining capability; and
3) Computer-controlled composite lay-up machines.
Personnel Practices
This company is an equal employment opportunity and 
affirmative action employer.
Workers employed by this company in Factory, Office, 
and Technical job classifications are represented in 
collective bargaining agreements with the company by the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers.
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Seniority, experience, skills, and abilities are 
criteria used to fill job vacancies. In order for a worker 
covered under the collective bargaining agreement to be 
considered for a promotion or transfer outside his or her 
own department, the individual must have on file with the 
Company a written Placement Request indicating the desired 
classification, plant, department, shift, and other 
information requested on the form. The worker is then 
considered for job vacancies in departments that he/she has 
indicated.
Environmental Conditions
Inasmuch as this company is governed by State, County 
and City regulations dealing with health and safety in the 
workplace, the company provides necessary safety devices 
for all employees working on hazardous and unsanitary work. 
The company furnishes clothing and safety items, such as 
ear plugs, respirators, safety harnesses, safety glasses, 
gloves, aprons, face masks, etc., as required.
At intervals established by the Company, physical 
examinations including X-rays and blood tests are provided 
for workers involved in potentially hazardous operations, 
such as painting, sandblasting, tank sealing, etc.
Safety Engineers test ladders, scaffolding, swing 
stages, hoisting, and other such equipment at reasonable 
intervals to ensure worker safety.
It is not uncommon for workers to work above ground 
ten to seventy-five feet above the factory floor on 
platforms, scaffolding or swing stages when performing 
assembly work.
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